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ABSTRACT
DIMENSIONS OF US GLOBAL FINANCIAL POWER:
ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL SANCTIONS, GLOBAL IMBALANCES, AND SOVEREIGN
DEFAULT
SEPTEMBER 2019
MARIAM MAJD
B.A., THE RICHARD STOCKTON COLLEGE OF NEW JERSEY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Gerald Epstein
This dissertation examines how U.S. capabilities in the global financial arena enable it to
affect outcomes to its advantage. The first essay presents theoretical support for the hypoth-
esis that holdings of U.S. sovereign debt collateralize public and private dollar borrowing in
developing and emerging market economies, thus enabling the U.S. to receive continued easy
financing despite declining economic fundamentals. The consensus view—what we refer to as
the Safe Assets theory—contends that what motivates continued investment in US sovereign
debt despite its drawbacks is its status as a safe asset : an asset that is strongly demanded
during and following adverse macroeconomic shocks. Though a safe asset is primarily iden-
tified by virtue of its effect rather than by underlying determinants of safeness, the former
is understood to be motivated by perceptions of the latter. Thus, the Safe Assets theory
viii
argues that perceptions of a country’s economic health buffer against consequences of its
decline.
While we do not argue against the notion that perception can play an important role
in sustaining demand for US sovereign debt, we draw on the well-developed sovereign debt
literature and argue that perception is unlikely to act alone. Namely, for lending to a
sovereign to occur, the structure of the relation between lender and sovereign borrower must
be such that it facilitates endogenous enforcement of the lending contract. Indeed, the Safe
Assets theory also concedes as much and assumes that if the US were to default on its
sovereign debt obligations, it would suffer a large reputational cost levied by its lenders.
We argue this assumption is unwarranted, however. To credibly threaten or levy such a
cost necessarily requires that a lender possess greater capabilities than a borrower (i.e., the
lender must be strong relative to the borrower.) It is therefore implausible to imagine that
developing and emerging market economy lenders could credibly threaten or impose a cost
onto the United States large enough to deter the latter from defaulting.
We argue that persistent demand for US Treasury securities from developing and emerg-
ing market economies is owing to its role as collateral for dollar credit. That is, public lending
enables private and public borrowing. Specifically, we argue that the rapid growth in dollar
credit to developing and emerging market economies leads to unfavorable investor percep-
tions of country volatility and increases the likelihood that inflows will reverse. Against this
prospect, developing and emerging market economies are incentivized to offer their lenders
collateral against the lending contract to secure continued access to dollar funds. US Trea-
sury securities are an ideal form of collateral to dollar lenders for three main reasons: first,
their scale of issuance enables lenders to require as collateral an asset large enough to dis-
incentivize default; second, as a slightly less liquid form of a country’s savings, US Treasury
securities enable the lender to seize the means by which a defaulted borrower would secure
ix
another lending contract; third, because custodianship of US Treasury securities largely lies
with the US, the lender is capable of costlessly retaliating against a defaulting borrower.
The second essay empirically tests the theory presented in Chapter 1 that public lend-
ing enables public and private borrowing for developing and emerging market economies.
Considering that most foreign holdings of US Treasury securities are in long-term securities
held by foreign official institutions, we model the decision to hold long-term US Treasury
securities as one to hold dollars in foreign exchange reserves, allowing us to draw from well-
developed models of the latter decision-making process. We use a first-difference estimator
to control for country-specific factors affecting both US Treasury security holdings and out-
standing dollar credit in a panel of thirteen developing and emerging market economies. To
incorporate a persistence effect of US Treasury security holdings, we introduce as a regressor
the dependent variable lagged by one period and estimate the regression equation using an
instrumental variable method.
We provide evidence that, indeed, a statistically significant relationship exists between
a country’s official holdings of US Treasury securities and its level of outstanding dollar
credit. Our results demonstrate that even after controlling for a persistence effect (i.e.,
inertia) in US Treasury security holdings, increases in outstanding dollar credit lead to a
statistically significant (p < 0.01) increase in holdings of US Treasury securities. Specifically,
the estimated increase in US Treasury security holdings resulting from a $1 billion increase
in outstanding dollar credit is $0.11 billion, all other factors held constant. Our result
is robust to alternative definitions of our control variables and to the removal of outliers.
Namely, our result is not driven by China’s disproportionate holdings of both US Treasury
securities and outstanding dollar credit. In fact, when China is removed from the sample
and our empirical model estimated again, the effect of outstanding dollar credit on holdings
of US Treasury securities increases in statistical significance (p < 0.001) and magnitude.
x
Specifically, when China is removed from the sample, a $1 billion increase in outstanding
dollar credit is associated with a $0.18 billion increase in US Treasury securities, all other
factors held constant.
Finally, the third essay of this dissertation examines the United States’ unique and rela-
tively recent ability to wield access to global financial networks as a distinctly effective sanc-
tioning tool. Through a review of the literature on sanctions, we highlight the similarities
between this latest form of financial sanction and its heavy-handed forerunner, comprehen-
sive trade sanctions. We specifically trace the evolution of US command over the Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) and its subsequent removal of
the Islamic Republic of Iran from the platform in 2012 (hereafter referred to as the SWIFT
sanction). To evaluate the impact of this new category of sanction, we utilize quarterly data
on Iran’s real GDP during the period 1988-2016 and employ a time-series forecasting tech-
nique to measure the cost of the SWIFT sanction to Iran’s real GDP, where cost is measured
by the difference between forecasted and actual real GDP.
Results generated from estimating a seasonal autoregressive integrated moving average
(ARIMA) model indicate that the impact to Iran’s real GDP of the SWIFT sanction is
sizeable. Specifically, the average quarterly cost of the SWIFT sanction to Iran’s real GDP
is approximately $204.3 billion (PPP-adjusted, 2015 international dollars), or 14.7% and
13.8% of Iran’s average quarterly actual and forecasted GDP, respectively.
xi
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C H A P T E R 1
WHAT EXPLAINS PERSISTENT FOREIGN DEMAND FOR US
SOVEREIGN DEBT? A THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT
1.1 Introduction
The movements of global capital flows have been the subject of much debate in large part
because of their selective and persistent flow toward long-term US sovereign debt. Figure
1 illustrates the growth of monthly foreign holdings of long-term US Treasury securities
during the period 1984-2016. The figure demonstrates that foreign holdings of long-term US
Treasury securities has grown rapidly since 2002 and at an increasing rate just prior to the
2008 global financial crisis.
Largely behind this inflow are foreign official institutions in emerging market and devel-
oping economies who, accordingly, constitute the largest proportion of investors in long-term
US Treasury securities. Figure 2 shows foreign holdings of US Treasury securities by holder
(private or foreign official) and type (long or short) during the period for which this data is
available.
The figure demonstrates that foreign investors hold long-term Treasury securities in larger
proportion than short-term Treasury securities; further, foreign official institutions hold the
largest proportion of long-term Treasury securities held by foreigners, though foreign private
1
Figure 1: Foreign Holdings of US Long-term Treasury Securities 1984-2016
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Notes: Data on holdings of long-term US Treasury securities is adjusted for valuation effects. Data is from
Bertaut and Judson (2014).
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Figure 2: Foreign Official Holdings of US Treasury Securities
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Notes: Data is from the Treasury International Capital Reporting System.
3
holdings have grown since approximately 2013.
Interestingly, demand for US sovereign debt has persisted despite its naturally accompa-
nying corollary: an increasing debt to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio. Indeed, by 2006,
the US current account deficit had reached an unprecedented level of 6% of GDP (Gourin-
chas and Rey, 2014). Continued funding of the US to and past this point is puzzling since
high debt to GDP ratios are conventionally understood to work against long-term prospects
for economic growth and should therefore disincentivize investment in a country’s public
debt (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010; Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli, 2011; Alfaro, Kalemli-
Ozcan, & Volosovych, V., 2014; He, Krishnamurthy and Milbradt, 2016). More striking,
demand for US debt has persisted despite two additional forces that typically operate to
reduce it: declining yields and dollar depreciation.
Figure 3 shows federal debt held by foreign and international investors, the real yield on
10-year Treasury securities, and the US dollar index during the period 2003-2018.
The figure shows that during the period 2008-2012 the real yield on 10-year Treasury
securities dropped from a high of approximately 2.6% to a low of -0.76% while the level of
federal debt held by foreign official and international investors steadily rose. This means
that demand for US debt persisted even as investments yielded increasingly less of a real
return and actually imposed a cost to investors. Additionally, during the period 2009-2011
the real value of the dollar was falling against other major advanced economy currencies,
meaning holders could reasonably expect to be repaid in currency worth relatively less than
it had been at the time the security was purchased.
According to conventional economic theory on capital flows and sovereign debt, none
of what has been described thus far should be happening. First, that capital should flow
from emerging market and developing economies to advanced ones contradicts the standard
economic theory developed by Robert Solow and Trevor Swan in 1956 (hereafter referred to
4
Figure 3: Federal Debt, the Real Yield and the US Dollar Index
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as the Solow-Swan model). The Solow-Swan model defines the rate of return on capital as
being equal to its marginal product minus deprecation. Assuming that the marginal product
of capital is decreasing in the level of capital stock, the model implies that the rate of return
on capital is higher in countries possessing a lower capital-to- worker ratio. Further assuming
that it is in “rich” countries where the capital-to-worker ratio is highest, then the Solow-
Swan model’s central prediction is that in an open and competitive environment, capital
will flow “downhill” in search of higher rates of return until the latter are equalized; that is,
capital will flow from rich to poor countries until international rates of return on capital are
the same.
Standard economic theory is also challenged since increasing demand for US sovereign
debt exists simultaneously with dollar depreciation and decreasing real yields. The liter-
ature on sovereign debt predicts that in response to dollar depreciation—considered to be
synonymous with US default (albeit implicitly) on its sovereign debt obligation—demand
and yields should decrease and increase, respectively.
The conventional approach to explaining sustained demand for US sovereign debt, even
despite these declines in quality is what we will refer to as the Safe Assets theory, which
argues that US Treasury securities are a safe asset : an asset that is flooded to during
and following adverse macroeconomic shocks. Though a safe asset is primarily defined and
identified by way of its effect rather than its characteristics, the attraction of US Treasury
securities is argued to be ultimately owing to its safeness, the latter of which is itself reliant
upon favorable investor perception of US financial development.
Thus, persistent demand for US Treasury securities in the Safe Assets theory is owing
to the combination of risk-aversion among developing and emerging market economies and
their perception that these securities constitute a safe asset. An important implication of the
Safe Assets theory which follows from its reliance on perception is that the stability of the
6
US financial system—and the global financial system tethered to it—is tenuous as continued
funding of the former only hinges on a change in perception.
Despite the popularity of the Safe Assets theory, it is subject to a logical flaw. Namely,
the Safe Assets theory fails to offer a plausible explanation of what mechanism enables
sovereign lending in the first instance. The literature has yielded strong conclusions that
sovereign lending does not occur absent of a lender’s ability to impose large punitive costs
onto a defaulted borrower. That is, at least in the case of sovereign lending, the proverbial
carrot is helpless to motivate when unaccompanied by the stick. The Safe Assets theory
assumes US willingness to repay its sovereign debt obligation is motivated by a desire to
avoid incurring a large reputational cost levied by its lenders; it does not consider, however,
that the strength of lenders (here, developing and emerging market economies) relative to
the borrower makes it highly unlikely that the former can impose a large punitive cost onto
the latter.
In this paper, we fill the gap left by the Safe Assets theory and provide an explanation
of what enables lending to the US in the first instance. Our theory is that developing and
emerging market economies hold US Treasury securities to collateralize private dollar bor-
rowing. That is, the persistent demand for US sovereign debt is at least partially motivated
by the reality that public lending enables private and public dollar borrowing.
We argue that the persistent demand for US Treasury securities from developing and
emerging market economies is a logical conclusion of the rapid growth in private dollar credit
to the latter (McCauley, McGuire and Sushko, 2015). As is well-known, capital inflows have
a perverse effect upon its recipients: inflows increase not only the recipient’s reliance on still
more inflows but also its debt to GDP ratio. This leads to unfavorable investor perceptions of
country volatility and increases the likelihood that inflows will reverse, leaving crisis in their
wake. Against these prospects, developing and emerging market economies are incentivized
7
to offer their lenders collateral against the lending contract to secure continued access to
dollar funds.
US Treasury securities are an ideal form of collateral to dollar lenders for three main
reasons: first, the scale of its issuance enables lenders to collateralize an asset large enough
to make the consequences of default larger than its benefit; second, by seizing a country’s
savings, the lender prevents the borrower from defaulting one debt obligation to enter into
another; finally, US Treasury securities are held in the lender’s jurisdiction, making it rela-
tively costless for the lender to retaliate against a defaulting borrower.
Because it identifies a motivation for investment in US Treasury securities less fleeting
than perception, one important implication of our theory is that the US ability to receive
continued and easy financing is more stable than the Safe Assets theory assumes. The theory
is put to empirical test in Chapter 3.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the literature on global imbalances to
set the stage for the introduction of the Safe Assets theory. Section 1.3 presents an analysis
and critique of the Safe Assets theory. Section 1.4 then presents an alternative theory to
explain persistent demand for US Treasury securities among developing and emerging market
economies. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 The Literature on Global Imbalances
In 1990, Robert E. Lucas, Jr. articulated what is popularly known as the Lucas Paradox :
despite the predictions of the Solow-Swan model, capital does not flow from rich to poor
countries to the degree expected (Lucas, 1990). Using the example of capital flows between
India and the United States, Lucas argued that return to capital should be much higher
in India than in the US, thus eliciting a flow of capital to the former of a magnitude not
8
observed in reality. Addressing two possible explanations commonly cited to reconcile the
lack of downhill flows with higher returns to capital—differences in labor productivity and
political risk—Lucas also challenges each in turn.
Differences in labor productivity can dampen the singular effect of higher worker to
capital ratios if the latter are also accompanied by a high marginal product of capital. Con-
trolling for possible differences in labor productivity, Lucas finds that though the profitability
of investment projects in poor countries is revised downwards once controlling for these dif-
ferences, capital investments in poor countries still generate a rate of return five times that
of what would be yielded by capital investments in a rich country. That is, even controlling
for the fact that levels of productivity may be higher in rich countries, economic theory still
predicts that capital should still flow from rich to poor countries at a rate much higher than
was observed.
Lucas further considers whether the puzzle can be solved if investments in human capital
have an exponential effect on productivity through technological innovation (that is, where
the investments in human capital are higher, the return to productivity is increasing and
not diminishing). Lucas finds that this adjustment does seemingly reconcile the puzzle
he presents, but only if unrealistic assumptions are adopted. Finally, Lucas addresses the
possibility that capital fails to flow downhill to the extent predicted because political risk
in poor countries compromises their ability to credibly commit to repayment. Rejecting the
notion, he argues that if political risk was relevant to the flow of capital to poor countries,
we might expect to have seen global capital flows equalized—at least between Europe and
India—during the period when poor countries were subject to the ostensibly stabilizing force
of colonial rule. Ultimately, Lucas leaves the puzzle he presents intact (Lucas, 1990).
Little more than two decades after the Lucas puzzle was articulated, the allocation puzzle
again presented a challenge to standard economic theory. Because it is assumed that pro-
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ductivity growth rises with technological progress, the neoclassical growth model predicts
that in a search for higher returns, capital should flow into countries that have reached the
same level of technological progress as the rest of the world (i.e., whose total factor produc-
tivity—or Solow residual—reaches the world frontier) and out of countries whose level of the
same has receded. The allocation puzzle, however, presented the finding that capital flows to
developing countries tend to be negatively correlated with their productivity growth. That
is, whereas Lucas articulated a dynamic in which too little funds were being received by
developing countries given their comparatively low capital-to-worker ratios, the allocation
puzzle added the mystifying detail that those developing countries experiencing higher rates
of productivity growth tend to receive less capital inflows.
More contemporary evidence suggests that the driving force behind this inverse rela-
tion between capital inflows and productivity growth is the public sector, as the sovereign
governments of developing and emerging market economies have largely saved the income
generated by comparatively high rates of economic growth (Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2013).
Again, standard economic theory is challenged by this phenomenon: higher volatility of
income and lower relative levels of development among developing and emerging market
economies yields the expectation that they will possess higher rates of borrowing and in-
vestment to smooth consumption intertemporally and promote development (Obstfeld and
Rogoff, 1995).
A number of theories have been posited to explain why levels of national savings have
increased in developing and emerging market economies. Highlighting the importance of an
export-led growth strategy for emerging markets, the Bretton Woods II hypothesis initially
focused on the dynamic between the United States and China to argue that emerging mar-
ket economies accumulate advanced economy debt (namely, US debt) to undervalue their
own currencies, thereby allowing their exports to remain competitive in advanced economy
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markets (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 2003). Because the demand for advanced
economy debt reflects a kind of dependency of emerging market economies on advanced
economies, the earliest version of the Bretton Woods II hypothesis implies that global im-
balances are fairly sustainable. That is, so long as advanced economy funding is used to
support an export-led growth strategy in emerging market and developing economies, global
imbalances will persist uninterrupted (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 2003, 2004).
Research efforts have been focused not only on discovering why developing and emerging
market economies have largely become net savers but also on why their savings are stored
in advanced economy assets. The latter reality is naturally an exacerbation of the Lucas
puzzle as it implies that capital not only fails to flow downhill in sufficient quantity (as
Lucas noticed), but that it also flows in the reverse direction. That is, capital flows uphill
from poor to rich countries.
One explanation is that the advanced economy with the highest rate of productivity
growth relative to other advanced economies will receive a disproportionate amount of cap-
ital inflows (Engel and Rogers, 2006). This justification does not, however, explain why
global capital flows are found distributed among advanced economies in the first place. In
addition, investment in advanced economies is mainly in fixed-income instruments and in
equity; if productivity growth was a factor attracting investment to advanced economies,
then we might reasonably expect those investments to be in assets that earn a rate of return
proportional to the rate of productivity growth (i.e., investors would want a portion of the
return generated from the increasing rate of productivity growth.) What is seen instead,
however, is that investments in advanced economies are in assets that offer a fixed rate of
return (Balakrishnan, Tulin and Bayoumi, 2007).
Another explanation highlights the function advanced economy debt serves as a reserve
asset : an asset that acts as a highly-liquid, international store of value. This view sees the
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increased savings rates among developing and emerging market economies as a reflection of
lessons learned from the series of domestic financial crises occurring in the mid-late nineties,
allegedly catalyzed by poorly allocated capital inflows. Thus, while the earliest version of
the Bretton Woods II hypothesis suggests the contemporary saving behavior of developing
and emerging market economies is opportunistic, this view understands it as precautionary:
saving reflects a precautionary motive according to which developing and emerging market
economies save to fortify their stock of foreign reserves in case severe macroeconomic shocks
are experienced again (Bernanke, 2005; Caballero, 2006; Bussie´re, Cheng, Chinn, and Lisack,
2015). The notion that developing and emerging market economies possess a precautionary
motive to save may imply a somewhat more forgiving view of saving behavior than the
Bretton Woods II hypothesis. Importantly, however, blame for precaution is squarely placed
upon developing and emerging market economies since it is theorized to be the inefficiencies
in the latter that ostensibly catalyzed the financial crises now acting as a motivating force
(Bernanke, 2005).
Why, then, investment in advanced economy debt? The conventional view argues that
uphill capital flows are the result of heterogeneity in securitization capacity; that is, uphill
capital flows are the result of the ability of countries to produce financial assets that are
both innovative and capable of acting as a store of value for a large amount of savings (i.e,
financial depth and breadth) (Balakrishman, Tulin, and Bayoumi, 2007; Caballero, Farhi
and Gourinchas, 2008; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2009; Vermeulen and de Haan, 2014).
The ability of a country to generate financial assets is understood to depend on a host of in-
stitutional, political, and economic factors that allow future output to be credibly pledged to
financiers; these factors include strong property rights that minimize the probability of expro-
priation, strong economic fundamentals, institutions that are capable of enforcing contracts,
economic policies amenable to market liberalization, high levels of macroeconomic stability,
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and low levels of political corruption and cronyism (Caballero, 2006; Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan
and Volosovych, 2014; Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas, 2008).
When these securitization-enabling factors are absent in a country that also possesses
a high growth rate and high desired rate of precautionary savings, the conventional view
argues that the result will be a flow of funds from asset-poor to asset-rich countries (i.e., from
countries where financial assets are scarce to countries where financial assets are plentiful).1
The empirical evidence on the link between financial depth and uphill flows has been
mixed. If a factor drawing global financial flows toward advanced economies is financial
depth and breadth, then we might expect those countries with less of a capacity to generate
deep and innovative financial assets to be more likely to invest in advanced economy financial
assets. Yet, some evidence demonstrates the opposite is true: levels of financial deepening
(measured by the ratio of near-money [M2] to GDP) is positively correlated with current
account balances; that is, among developing and emerging market economies, more financial
development is associated with a greater level of national saving (Chinn and Prasad, 2003;
Chinn and Ito, 2007; Gruber and Kamin, 2009). In addition, developing and emerging
market economy savings overwhelmingly flows to perhaps the least innovative, advanced-
economy financial asset: sovereign debt. This offers a reason to question the appeal of
financial breadth in drawing global capital flows toward advanced economies.
The asset-rich country receiving a disproportionate inflow of developing and emerging
1The formal treatment of this explanation relies on a model of global intertemporal equilibrium. Given
two, one-good, pure endowment economies and two time periods (1 and 2), the autarky rate of interest
for either country will be driven upwards when the savings rate in a country is lower and impatience (the
degree to which agents prefer to consume in period 1 and therefore prefer to borrow against future income)
is higher; accordingly, the autarky rate of interest will be driven downwards when the savings rate is higher
and impatience lower. If the model is populated by two countries, A and B, that differ in their preferred
rate of savings and level of impatience—where country A possesses more impatience and a low savings rate
(characteristic of advanced economies) and country B possesses less impatience and a high savings rate
(characteristic of developing and emerging economies)—then country A will have a higher autarky rate of
interest than country B; accordingly, in period 1, we would expect that country A will borrow from country
B. That is, we would expect that capital would flow uphill (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995).
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market economy savings for at least the past two decades is the United States. Indeed, this
reality prompted many to identify a global savings glut as the culprit of the 2008 global
financial crisis and the subsequent ineffectiveness of US monetary policy to respond. That a
country’s financial sector would act as such an influential determinant of uphill capital flows
is challenged by this persistent demand for US sovereign debt, especially prior to the 2008
financial crisis. Figure 1 illustrates that in 2008, foreign holdings of long-term US Treasury
securities grew at an increasing rate even as New York-based Bear Stearns and Lehman
Brothers collapsed.
Thus, demand for US sovereign debt—ostensibly motivated by the financial depth and
breadth of the US—was most strong when by all reasonable measure, the US was on the
verge of financial collapse. What is more, at this same time, the real yield on 10-year Trea-
sury securities precipitously fell and the dollar depreciated against other advanced economy
currencies (see Figure 3). Relatedly, empirical evidence suggests that large trade balance
adjustments in the US have little effect on the demand for US sovereign debt (Kamin, Reeve
and Sheets, 2007).
In response to these uniquely puzzling aspects of developing and emerging economy de-
mand for US sovereign debt, the predominant Safe Assets theory argues that US Treasury
securities are a safe asset. We now turn to that theory in more detail.
1.3 The Safe Assets Theory
The Safe Assets theory argues that uphill capital flows and the persistence of demand for
US Treasury securities can be explained by the latter’s status as a safe asset, particularly in
the foreign exchange reserves of developing and emerging market economies. What exactly
determines a safe asset is somewhat difficult to discern, however, as is readily acknowledged
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by the literature itself (Caballero and Farhi, 2014). In its most concrete form, a safe asset
is defined as one that is flocked to during periods of crisis, thus allowing it to retain its
value even (and especially) under such circumstances (Maggiori, 2013; Caballero and Farhi,
2014). Thus, the Safe Assets theory is in many ways a restatement of an earlier explanation
of uphill capital flows whereby investments in advanced economy debt act as a reserve asset
(Bernanke, 2005; Caballero, 2006; Bussie´re et al., 2015). What is different about the Safe
Assets theory, however, it that it now adds as a quality of reserve assets a strong appeal
during periods of severe macroeconomic instability.
Thus, a safe asset is primarily detected by virtue of its effect rather than by underlying
determinants of safeness. That is, a safe asset is safe because it behaves as if it is safe,
though determinants of safeness are not subject to rigorous analysis. Curiously, however,
to the degree that safeness is reflective of belief in the solvency of a sovereign borrower,
the perception of safeness can make the quality manifest since continued financing allows
a borrower to meet past debt obligations. This dynamic is referred to in the literature as
strategic complementarity whereby investor behaviors are complements since more safe asset
purchases generates even more safe asset purchases. The conclusion yielded from a stylized
model developed to explain the safe asset status of US Treasury securities is illustrative: “The
safety of a safe asset depends on investor beliefs. Safety is endogenous, and when investors
believe an asset will be safe, their actions can make that asset safe” (He, Krishnamurthy,
and Milbradt, 2016, p. 523).
Though the Safe Assets theory is borne from dynamics that challenge whether a country’s
financial asset-generating capacity is a determinant of capital inflows, it is still tethered to
this view in the following ways. First, the theory argues that what determines the choice
between safe assets is understood to be relative debt capacity. That is, if the existence of
safe assets is given (i.e., we begin from a state of the world where safe assets exist though for
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reasons unknown), then what determines investor selection between safe assets—i.e., whether
a foreign official or private investor chooses to hold the safe assets of country A or B, for
instance—is how much debt a country can issue.
Debt capacity plays a large role in safe asset selection according to the Safe Assets
theory because of investor preferences and expectations: investors prefer to sustain the
largest quantity of safe assets possible and expect other investors to prefer the same; as a
result, investors expect investment flows into countries with the largest capacity to issue
debt and will therefore also invest in the same. This behavior constitutes an endogenous
process whereby the debt of countries with the largest debt capacity actually becomes safe.
The theory argues that this herding behavior towards the safe assets of the sovereign nation
with the largest debt capacity illustrates a “nowhere else to go” principal: investors seeking
safe assets have “nowhere else to go” but the debt of the sovereign nation with the largest
debt capacity (He, Krishnamurthy, and Milbradt, 2016, p.519).
Second, though not readily apparent, a detailed analysis of the safe asset theory reveals
that debt capacity is understood to stand as a proxy for the financial depth of a country
which is, in turn, generated by the strength of its economic fundamentals. Given that the
goal of the safe asset theory is to explain the resiliency of US sovereign debt in the absence of
strong economic fundamentals, this last point could reasonably be a source of confusion. The
argument can be made clearer, however, once thresholds are considered. The Safe Assets
theory effectively holds that absolute economic fundamentals may sustain a level of debt
issuance so large that it surpasses a certain threshold beyond which the debt enters a class
of its own: it is perceived to be safe simply by virtue of its size (i.e., the debt is safe because
it was able to reach such a large level.)
Once beyond this threshold, it becomes assumed that debt capacity stands as a proxy for
financial depth generated from strong economic fundamentals, where the strategic comple-
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mentarity of investor behavior serves to reinforce the perception. The assumption becomes
so embedded and the reinforcing effect of investor behavior so strong that the primary de-
terminant of safe asset selection becomes debt capacity, even to the extent that it overrides
the implications of its required result: poor economic fundamentals of a safe-asset issuing
country (He, Krishnamurthy and Milbradt, 2016). In this way, the debt capacity of a safe-
asset issuing country is both dependent on and a departure from the literature attempting to
explain the phenomenon of uphill capital flows by way of the financial depth and breadth of
advanced economies (Balakrishnan, Tulin, and Bayoumi, 2007; Caballero, Farhi and Gour-
inchas, 2008; Antras and Caballero, 2009; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2009).
One important implication of the Safe Assets theory is that because the safeness of
safe assets is ultimately perceived, its loss as an attribute is simply dependent on the loss
of this perception. Applied to the case of the United States, which is understood to have
possessed the world’s largest store of safe assets for at least the past fifty years, the reliance on
investor perceptions of safeness implies that the solvency of the United States is necessarily
tenuous as it only requires a change in investor confidence to threaten it (Caballero and
Farhi, 2014; He, Krishnamurthy and Milbradt, 2016; Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas 2016,
2017; Farhi and Maggiori, 2017). That is, the stability of the US financial system (and
by extension, the global financial system) stands on a knife-edge where the central factor
determining continued balance is investor perception of the US ability to repay its sovereign
debt. Further, because investor confidence may be strengthened to an extent that sustains
declining economic fundamentals of the safe-asset issuing country, it becomes unclear at
what point a safe asset-issuing country will have gone too far in stretching its debt capacity.
The system is, therefore, fragile (Farhi and Maggiori, 2017).
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1.3.1 A Critique of the Safe Assets Theory
In this section, we will critique the logical foundation of the Safe Assets theory, thereby
challenging the notion that perception can provide a comprehensive explanation to the puzzle
that is persistent demand for US sovereign debt. To set the stage for our critique, we begin
this section with a brief overview of the sovereign debt literature. Our main point will be
that this literature yields the strong conclusion that lending to a sovereign fails to occur
in the absence of a mechanism enforcing the debt contract. We argue that the Safe Assets
theory does not provide such a mechanism to a plausible degree, thus rendering it insufficient
as a complete explanation of persistent foreign demand for US sovereign debt.
A central focus of the sovereign debt literature is the risk of lending to a sovereign in the
presence of sovereign immunity—a legal doctrine protecting the independence of sovereign
governments by ensuring their immunity to criminal or civil prosecution. The doctrine
necessarily restrains lenders from enforcing debt contracts with sovereign borrowers since
there does not exist any supra-national legal system that can facilitate enforcement. As
a result, sovereign lending belongs to a distinct group of economic exchanges where an
agency problem exists because the difficulty inherent in monitoring the good or service to
be exchanged makes a contract unable to be third-party (exogenously) enforceable at the
same time that one of the parties (namely, the borrower) has the ability to benefit or harm
another by repaying the loan or defaulting on it, respectively. 2
Nevertheless, lending to sovereigns does indeed occur and the current consensus view
2In this context of a sovereign borrower who enters into a non-contingent debt contract—a contract that
specifies a set of dates and payments that must be made to the lender irrespective of (i.e., not contingent
upon) the state of the sovereign—default is a failure of a sovereign borrower to honor its debt contract,
either by a refusal to pay or by necessitating a renegotiation of the debt contract in terms less favorable to
the lender (Aguiar and Amador, 2014). If the debt is to be repaid in the borrower’s currency, then the latter
form of default—repayment in terms less favorable to the lender—can occur implicitly through inflation or
depreciation of the borrower’s currency. Through implicit default, the lender may receive repayment that
fulfills the debt contract in nominal terms but is worth less in real terms.
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argues this is because there is enforcement power governing debt contracts with sovereign
borrowers; it simply is not exercised by a third-party. Rather, enforcement power is under-
stood to arise endogenously from the relation between the parties to the contract. That is,
by virtue of the relationship between lender and sovereign borrower, a structure either exists
or is created that makes default costlier to the sovereign borrower than repayment. The
methods by which repayment is endogenously secured are called endogenous enforcement
mechanisms (Bowles and Gintis, 1990, as cited in Prem, 1994).
Endogenous enforcement mechanisms generally fall within three categories: contingent
renewal, collateralization, and retaliation (Bowles and Gintis, 1990, as cited in Prem, 1994).
Contingent renewal utilizes the desire of the borrower to borrow again (i.e., to renew the debt
contract) and accordingly requires future borrowing to be contingent upon present payment.
As applied to the case of international credit markets and sovereign borrowing, contingent
renewal implies that lending to sovereign borrowers occurs because lenders are confident that
the threat of exclusion from international credit markets in the case of default operates to
endogenously enforce repayment; in such a circumstance, sovereign borrowers are said to be
incentivized to protect their reputation (where exclusion from international credit markets
is said to constitute a reputational cost.)
Collateralization as an endogenous enforcement mechanism refers to the loss of a default-
ing borrower’s asset posted as collateral; importantly, for the loss to disincentivize default,
the asset must be large enough so that the borrower’s cost of default is greater than the cost
of compliance. Collateralization is also linked to the endogenous enforcement mechanism
of retaliation since it is when the lender retaliates against a defaulting borrower by seizing
collateral that collateralization is employed as an enforcement mechanism. But, retaliation
also encompasses a wider set of methods, especially in the context of international credit
markets and sovereign borrowers. These methods include seizing the borrower’s assets over-
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seas (financial or otherwise), impeding its trade, and/or intervening militarily. Again, these
methods only operate to endogenously enforce repayment if the cost levied onto the sovereign
borrower outweighs the benefit from default.
Importantly, for endogenous enforcement mechanisms to enable lending to sovereign bor-
rowers, it must necessarily be the case that lenders are strong, or better situated, than
borrowers. This is so because excluding defaulting borrowers from international credit mar-
kets requires coordination among lenders and other market participants to make the cost of
the latter’s potential engagement with defaulting borrowers larger than its benefit. But, en-
couraging coordination requires capital and influence since cooperation must extend widely
in international capital markets and imposing costs is not costless (Eaton and Fernandez,
1995; Epstein and Gintis, 1995). Similarly, military intervention or seizure of the borrower’s
assets requires that the lender possess a powerful military and be powerfully situated in
trade and financial networks, respectively (Epstein and Gintis, 1995). If the borrower pos-
sesses greater capabilities than the lender, then the outcome is straightforward: the borrower
will be capable of circumventing the lender’s attempts of endogenously enforcing the debt
contract, thus rendering endogenous enforcement mechanisms ineffective.
The literature on sanctions is also helpful in demonstrating the requisite relative ca-
pabilities between borrower and lender. For sanctions levied onto a sovereign nation to be
successful, researchers find that the recipient, or target, must bear more costs than the sender
(Eaton and Engers, 1992, 1999; Davis and Engerman, 2003; Drezner, 1999; Hufbauer, Schott
and Elliott, 1990). For instance, Eaton and Engers (1992) describe the impacts of what they
call toughness—a measure of a country’s willingness to incur costs and ability to withstand
them—on sanction outcome. They find that the likelihood of sanction success is greatest
when the sender is tough relative to the target (i.e., when the sender’s ability and willing-
ness to withstand costs is high relative to a target). Indeed, reality is a testament to this
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requisite dynamic: sanctions generally tend to be levied by stronger countries onto weaker
ones (Hanlon, 1986; Drury, 1998; Levy, 1999). As reported in Davis and Engerman (2003),
“In the 115 cases of economic sanctions deployed since 1914. . . the GNP of the sender (or
principal initiator) of sanctions was nearly always over ten times that of the target and in
the majority of cases more than 50 times greater” (p. 191).
Having briefly reviewed some of the basic findings of the literature on sovereign lending,
we can now return to the Safe Assets theory. The Safe Assets theory assumes that the
endogenous enforcement mechanisms enabling lending to the US are contingent renewal
and retaliation; specifically, it assumes that if the US defaults on its debt obligation, it
will incur a reputational or direct cost. As has been shown, such an assumption relies on
conceptualizing the lending dynamic as one between a strong lender and a weak borrower
(Farhi and Maggiori, 2017).
But, can the United States reasonably be considered weak relative to its developing and
emerging market economy counterparts? That is, is it reasonable to assume that standard
endogeneous enforcement mechanisms are operative because developing and emerging market
economies can coordinate to exclude the US from international capital markets or credibly
threaten to seize assets large enough to make the cost of default higher than its benefit?
The evidence suggests that this is not a reasonable assumption. Research findings
strongly suggest that the United States maintains a central position in the structure of
what can be thought of as a global financial network.3 The research in international political
economy, particularly from the vantage point of political science, is instructive in describing
3It is worth noting that we are aware of the declinist narrative predicting the demise of US hegemony
(see, for example, Wallerstein, 2006). While a description or analysis of this literature is beyond the scope
of this paper, it is useful to point out that the declinist narrative argues that, currently, US hegemony has
declined in a relative sense and not in an absolute sense. That is, while the absolute structural position of
the United States in the global arena is subject to debate, its current hegemony relative to other countries is
not. Thus, even if the declinist narrative is adopted, the point highlighted in this paper—that relative to the
United States, emerging and developing countries possess a less central position in the global arena—should
not constitute a challenge to our conclusion.
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the central position and consequent capabilities of the United States in the international
financial arena. For instance, using network analysis to analyze data on cross-national bank-
ing ties from the Bank of International Settlements, Winecoff (2015) concludes that the
United States possesses the most cross-national banking ties of any other leading economy
such that the US can properly be described as the “world’s banker” (p. 507).4 Winecoff
argues that this position not only failed to be diminished by the 2008 global financial crisis
but was actually enhanced as US competitors were weakened.5
Additional research demonstrates that the Federal Reserve’s access to liquidity enables
it to take on the global financial role of international lender of last resort during crises
and especially to countries where instability would threaten US interests (McDowell, 2017).6
Further demonstrative of US capabilities in global financial networks is its ability, post 9-
11, to monitor global financial institutions and transactions. In 2001, Title III of the USA
Patriot Act gave the US Treasury Secretary broad discretion to subject banking and financial
institutions (domestic and global) to increased scrutiny. Further, in 2006, the CIA, overseen
by the Treasury department, subpoenaed and won access to the financial records database of
the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT): a privately-
run, Brussels-based global financial messaging company currently possessing the world’s only
centralized infrastructure through which international financial institutions interact.
Considering the centrality of the US in the global arena, the notion that lenders and
market participants from developing and emerging market economies could credibly threaten
or impose a reputational cost onto the United States that would disincentivize default is
4Per Winecoff (2015), a tie is formed when banks in one country hold assets in another.
5See also Oatley, Winecoff, Pennock and Bauerle Danzman (2013).
6The term “international lender of last resort” originates with Kindleberger (1986). An international
lender of last resort is defined as: “An actor that is prepared to respond to international financial crises
by providing credit to illiquid institutions in foreign jurisdictions when no other actor is willing or able”
(McDowell, 2017, p. 4).
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implausible. Realistically these lenders and market participants possess neither the access
nor the reach to obstruct US circumvention of their efforts.7 Further, by virtue of the
US role as “world’s banker,” it is necessarily the case that it holds the largest variety and
amount of foreign financial assets, reasonably warranting consideration of how, in the case of
default, developing and emerging market economy lenders might seize the requisite amount of
financial assets that would make retaliation effective. Finally, though it is generally accepted
that military intervention is no longer employed as a response to sovereign default, it is worth
noting that this antiquated strategy is unlikely to reemerge as a tactic given US military
capabilities.
The loss of standard endogenous enforcement mechanisms leaves only perceptions of
safeness to account for the phenomenon of sovereign lending in the Safe Assets theory. While
perception likely plays some role in sovereign debt dynamics, it is implausible that it can be
the only factor enabling sovereign lending. That something more substantive than perception
motivates persistent demand for US Treasury securities is also suggested by the variation of
holdings across emerging market economy foreign official institutions. To illustrate, Figure 4
plots data on long-term Treasury security holdings for a select group of emerging economies
as a percentage of their gross domestic product (GDP), imports and exports during the
period 2006-2016.8
Given its reliance on investor perception, the Safe Assets theory concludes that investors
have “nowhere else to go” but the advanced economy with the largest debt capacity. The
empirical reality, however, belies such a strict constraint. Given a set of countries motivated
7It is useful to point out that even China, perhaps the most capable of emerging economy holders of US
sovereign debt, is not understood to exert substantial influence in financial markets (Aizenman & Ito, 2016).
For this reason, critics of the declinist narrative argue that the latter puts too much emphasis on factors such
as GDP to argue that the US is in decline. Rather, they argue that a more comprehensive set of indicators
should be analyzed to determine prominence in the global arena (Beckley, 2012; Norloff, 2014).
8Long-term Treasury security holdings are expressed as the percentage of the country’s GDP to control
for country size across selected emerging-market countries.
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Figure 4: Holdings of Long-term US Treasury Securities by Indicator and Country
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Notes: Data on long-term holdings of US Treasury securities is adjusted for valuation effects. Data on long-
term US Treasury security holdings is from Bertaut and Judson (2014). Export and import data specifically
refers to merchandise exports and imports, respectively, and is from the World Trade Organization. Data
on real GDP is from the World Bank.
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to invest a disproportionately high level of national savings (i.e, emerging market economies),
however, we would expect to see a somewhat more even distribution of US government debt
holdings if investors have “nowhere else to go.” That is, a singular determinant should
produce a more uniform outcome across similarly-situated countries.9 What is seen from
Figure 4, however, is that holdings of US government debt among emerging market countries
displays quite a bit of variation across country and through time.
In the next section, we introduce a more plausible alternative to the Safe Assets theory
that is consistent with standard sovereign lending dynamics and implications arising from
the relative strength of borrowers in this circumstance.
1.4 US Treasury Securities as Collateral for Private Dollar Bor-
rowing
Occurring simultaneously with the persistent demand for US Treasury securities, yet
unconnected to it in the literature thus far, is dollar credit to developing and emerging
market economies. McCauley, McGuire and Sushko (2015) report that dollar credit to non-
US residents reached approximately $7 trillion or 13% of non-US GDP by 2014. Indeed,
dollar credit to non-US residents picked up faster than to US residents after the global
financial crisis and at rates between 10-20%. China accordingly saw non-financial businesses
and households more than double its holdings of foreign currency credit immediately after
the crisis (Borio, McCauley and McGuire, 2011).
In one respect, capital inflows fulfill its conventional purpose of allowing developing and
emerging market economies to smooth consumption. At the same time, however, developing
9Naturally, we do not argue that all emerging-market economies are similarly situated; rather, we argue
that they are conceived to be similarly situated in their demand for US sovereign debt.
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and emerging market economies face significant obstacles in constraining the capital inflows
on which they are reliant. For instance, non-financial residents and businesses have his-
torically reacted to higher domestic interest rates by borrowing from non-domestic sources.
Further, the standard prescription for damming capital inflows—allowing the exchange rate
to appreciate (i.e., enabling it to float)—can actually exacerbate international credit inflows
since appreciation relieves the debt-to-cash-flow ratio, thereby creating room for a greater
debt burden (Borio, McCauley, and McGuire, 2011).
Supply of capital inflows is similarly unwieldy since the forces dictating the flow of in-
ternational credit are beyond the purview of recipient countries. For instance, McCauley,
McGuire and Sushko (2015) find that during tranquil times (i.e., non-crisis periods when
advanced economies’ financial institutions are healthy) easy US monetary policy drives a
surge of private dollar credit into developing and emerging economies. Similarly, Rey (2015)
famously argues that US monetary policy travels via a “global financial cycle,” the move-
ments of which are dictated by perceptions of risk and volatility manifested in the Chicago
Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX).10
A principal risk of unwieldly capital inflows is derived from the fact that leverage ratios
are directly factored into calculations of country volatility by investors (McCauley et al.,
2015; Avdjiev, Kuti and Takats, 2012). Thus, higher leverage is accompanied by the risk
that capital inflows will be reduced—often spontaneously and rapidly—below desired levels,
inciting crisis upon departure. Indeed, a higher growth rate of international credit relative
to overall total credit has generally become cause for concern given that the trend tends
to precede crisis, with the Asian Financial Crisis serving as one particularly severe example
(Borio, McCauley and McGuire, 2011).
10The Bank for International Settlements loosely defines a financial cycle as “self-reinforcing interactions
between perceptions of value and risk, risk-taking and financing constraints which translate into financial
booms and busts.” (Borio, McCauley and McGuire, 2011, p.2)
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Given the unwieldiness of capital inflows, developing and emerging market economies
necessarily lack control over the degree to which their financial systems are leveraged. They
can, however, control the degree to which they are vulnerable to endogenous enforcement
mechanisms. That is, developing and emerging market economy borrowers can calm investor
fears and secure access to credit by increasing the degree to which they suffer a penalty in
the case of default.
Specifically, the sovereign debt literature yields the conclusion that borrowers can increase
their vulnerability to lenders by offering the latter collateral against the debt contract. In-
deed, from the lender’s vantage point, collateralization is the most preferred endogenous
enforcement mechanism because it allows the lender to avoid most of the difficulties inherent
in other endogenous enforcement mechanisms. To illustrate, recall that seizing the bor-
rower’s assets in the case of default requires that a lender be sufficiently strong to withstand
the costs incurred (e.g., fending off an aggrieved borrower and its allies). It also requires
the borrower’s assets be in the jurisdiction of a legal system amenable to the lender’s de-
mands. Indeed, the difficulty in gaining the cooperation of foreign jurisdictions where a
borrower’s assets are held is one that the literature highlights as a main factor preventing
the effectiveness of retaliation (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Bulow and Rogoff, 1989; Eaton
and Fernandez, 1995; Pitchford and Wright, 2013).
The seizure of collateral, however, obviates these difficulties as the asset to be seized
is presumably already in the possession of the lender and within the jurisdiction of a legal
system amenable to the latter’s interests. Additionally, because it was offered prior to the
debt contract taking effect, the lender is assured upon entering the agreement that collateral
is large enough to make the consequence of default larger than its benefit.
Accordingly, we theorize that faced with an inability to control the degree to which their
financial systems are leveraged but wanting to maintain access to much needed dollar credit,
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developing and emerging market economies collateralize inflows of dollar credit with US
Treasury securities. Indeed, given those qualities of collateral that make collateralization
a particularly preferred endogenous enforcement mechanism among lenders, US Treasury
securities are uniquely suited to act as collateral for dollar credit.
Because the US is unique in the scale of its debt issuance, dollar lenders are presumably
able to require borrowers to hold US Treasury securities in sufficient quantity to make the
cost of default greater than its benefit. Additionally, because foreign official holdings of US
Treasury securities are held with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, lenders are assured
that assets to be seized reside with a custodian amenable to lender interests, making retal-
iation virtually costless.11 Finally, US Treasury securities are ideally suited to collateralize
sovereign borrowing because being the form in which country savings are held, Treasury
securities are also the means by which a defaulting sovereign would service another loan.
Thus, in the case of default, dollar lenders are able to costlessly exclude the borrower from
international capital markets by disrupting the latter’s future payments.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
The persistent flow of investment toward long-term US sovereign debt by foreign official
investors in developing and emerging market economies is puzzling for two reasons. First,
that capital should flow “uphill” from developing and emerging market economies to ad-
vanced ones contradicts standard economic theory assuming higher marginal rates of return
in relatively poorer economies; that is, standard economic theory predicts capital will flow
11If retaliation is costly to the lender (perhaps because impeding the borrower’s trade also significantly
affects the lender’s current account), the borrower has less reason to believe the lender will in fact retaliate
(i.e., the threat of retaliation will not disincentivize default because it will not be viewed as credible) (Eaton
and Fernandez, 1995).
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downhill until marginal rates of return on capital are equalized. Second, holdings of US
Treasury securities among developing and emerging market economies persist even despite
dollar depreciation, decreasing real yields, and declining US economic fundamentals.
The conventional view, which we refer to as the Safe Assets theory, explains the per-
sistence of demand for US Treasury securities among developing and emerging market
economies by way of the asset’s safeness, which is a function of the issuer’s financial breadth
and depth. The Safe Assets theory is logically flawed, however, in that its assumptions
run counter to sovereign lending dynamics. Specifically, the Safe Assets theory assumes
endogenous enforcement mechanisms enabling sovereign lending are satisfied when the rela-
tive strength between borrowers and lenders in this circumstance renders such mechanisms
ineffective. In the absence of an endogenous enforcement mechanism, perceptions of safe-
ness alone cannot enable sovereign lending and this suggests that another factor besides
perception motivates demand for US Treasury securities.
We present an alternative theory to explain what motivates the persistent demand for
US Treasury securities among developing and emerging market economies. We contend that
US Treasury securities act as collateral for private dollar borrowing. In the next chapter, we
put this theory to empirical test.
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C H A P T E R 2
LENDING TO BORROW: US SOVEREIGN DEBT AS
COLLATERAL FOR DOLLAR CREDIT
2.1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, foreign investment in US sovereign debt (i.e., Treasury secu-
rities) has grown at an increasing rate, more than quintupling to approximately $5.3 trillion
dollars by 2016. Persistent foreign demand for US Treasury securities presents a number
of challenges to conventional economic theory. Because high debt to GDP ratios are con-
ventionally understood to counteract a country’s long-run economic growth prospects, the
former should disincentivize investment in a country’s sovereign debt (Reinhart and Rogoff,
2010; Cecchetti, Mohanty and Zampolli, 2011; Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych, 2014;
He, Krishnamurthy and Milbradt, 2016). Yet, foreign demand for US Treasury securities
remains strong despite an unprecedented US current account deficit of 6% of GDP (Gourin-
chas and Rey, 2014). What is more, since roughly 2000, the real yield on 10-year Treasury
securities and the foreign exchange value of the dollar against leading currencies has fallen.
That is, the US continues to receive financing even as it offers less of a return to investors
and implicitly defaults on its current debt obligations.1
1Aguiar and Amador (2014) define default as a failure of a sovereign borrower to honor its debt contract,
either explicitly by an outright refusal to pay (which is how borrower default is conventionally understood) or
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Largely behind this increasing level of financing are foreign official investors in developing
and emerging market economies who hold US Treasury securities in foreign exchange reserves.
This rapid accumulation gained new attention as a culprit not only of the 2008 global financial
crisis but also of the ineffectiveness of monetary policy to respond.2 While subsequent
research has revealed new insights on the causes of the crisis and its aftermath, the persistent
demand for US Treasury securities from developing and emerging economies continues to fuel
debate.3
What explains these puzzling features of demand for US sovereign debt and can we expect
them to continue? One prominent theory argues that US Treasury securities are perceived
to be a “safe” asset. Specifically, debt capacity beyond a certain threshold is assumed to be
generated from strong economic fundamentals, leading to the perception that those countries
with the highest debt capacity must necessarily be the safest sources of investment. Thus,
while standard determinants of asset selection are thought to inform investment decisions
between safe assets, the perception that an asset is safe increases the degree of deterioration
in terms lenders will tolerate.
Owing to the ubiquity of this perception, the latter is self-reinforcing since during periods
of crisis investors will flood the asset they perceive to be safe. This herd behavior drives a
secular decline in real interest rates, thus rendering monetary policy ineffective once nominal
interest rates hit the zero lower bound. According to this view, which we will call the Safe
Assets theory, the continued financing of the US deficit is highly tenuous since its reliance on
perception makes it highly vulnerable to a self-fulfilling debt crisis (Maggiori, 2013; Caballero
implicitly by repaying in terms less favorable to the lender. When the loan is to be repaid in the borrower’s
currency, then one form of implicit default occurs through depreciation of the borrower’s currency since
repayment only fulfills the debt contract in nominal terms.
2See Ben Bernanke’s well-known Sandridge Lecture on the “Global Savings Glut” (Bernanke, 2005)
3For instance, Shin (2011) argues that European global banks played a key role in generating easy credit
conditions in the US prior to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.
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and Farhi, 2014; He, Krishnamurthy and Milbradt, 2016).
Despite its popularity, the Safe Assets theory is flawed. If perceptions based on debt
capacity played such a large role in determining the degree of investment in US Treasury
securities among developing and emerging market economies, then holdings among the latter
should be somewhat uniformly distributed. Yet, developing and emerging market economy
holdings of US Treasury securities are heterogeneous, indicating that country-specific factors
may influence levels of holdings.4 Additionally, it is unlikely that a loan to the US would
serve as an investment in the traditional sense since there exists no plausible enforcement
mechanism to secure it. The literature on sovereign debt has long established that sovereign
immunity makes it highly unlikely that sovereign lending will occur in the absence of a
lender’s ability to reasonably secure repayment (Eaton and Gersowitz, 1981; Bulow and
Rogoff, 1989; Epstein and Gintis, 1995).5 This ability is exercised through an enforcement
mechanism that imposes a cost to the borrower larger than the benefit from default. (Bulow
and Rogoff, 1989).
But, naturally, imposing a cost and especially a large one, is itself costly; thus, we
can reasonably expect that when loans are made, lenders will be strong and borrowers
weak (Epstein and Gintis, 1995). Otherwise, lenders expecting a sovereign borrower to
circumvent any attempt to enforce the lending contract, would not lend in the first instance.
Given the relative strength between lenders (developing and emerging market economies)
and borrowers (the US) in this circumstance, it is implausible that lenders would be capable
of threatening the borrower with a cost of default high enough to outweigh its benefits.
Thus, while perception can certainly play a role in the appeal of US Treasury securities, it
4See Figure 4 in Chapter 1 of this dissertation for an illustration of heterogeneity in US Treasury security
holdings across a subset of developing and emerging market economies.
5Though a review of the sovereign debt literature is beyond the scope of this essay, a review can be found
in the Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
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is unlikely that this perception alone can offer a comprehensive explanation of the puzzle.
In this paper, we present and provide empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that
US Treasury securities play the role of collateral for private and public dollar credit. That is,
public lending to the US enables private and public borrowing for developing and emerging
market economies. Our argument highlights a significant development in the global finan-
cial arena that, despite occurring simultaneously with the buildup of US Treasury security
holdings, has yet to be connected to the latter: the growth of dollar credit in developing and
emerging market economies. Indeed, dollar credit to borrowers outside of the US reached
approximately $7 trillion, or 13% of non-US GDP (McCauley, McGuire and Sushko, 2015).
But, credit is not secured on hope. As mentioned, lenders must be reasonably sure the
loan will be repaid and employ enforcement mechanisms to maximize the likelihood of this
outcome. While these mechanisms are easily availed to lenders in the domestic context
owing to the presence of courts and an abiding legal system, lenders to sovereign borrowers
must rely on endogenous enforcement mechanisms, or disciplining devices arising from the
structure of the lending relationship itself. One of the more effective mechanisms can be
provided by the borrower who offers the lender collateral to be seized in the event of a
default.
The role collateral plays in facilitating the smooth transaction of funds has gone relatively
unnoticed in the more recent literature, but it is crucial nevertheless.6 US Treasury securities
are an ideal form of collateral to dollar loans not only because the borrower’s financial assets
are denominated in the lender’s currency but also because custodianship enables the lender to
costlessly seize these assets in the case of default. Importantly, because retaliation is virtually
costless (i.e., all the lender must do is seize a financial asset already in its possession), the
6For a full treatment of the role collateral plays in facilitating the smooth transition of funds, see Singh
(2016).
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Figure 5: US Treasury Security Holdings and Outstanding Dollar Credit 2003-2016
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Notes: See Table 12 in Appendix A for data sources and definitions. See Table 13 in Appendix A for country
codes. The regression illustrated by the fitted line in the left panel (China included) results in a coefficient
of 1.90 (standard error = 0.058), N=689, and Adjusted R-squared=0.612. The regression illustrated by the
fitted line in the right panel (China Omitted) results in a coefficient of 0.51 (standard error = 0.037), N=636,
and Adjusted R-squared=0.231
threat of retaliation is credible, making default less likely in the first instance. Finally, while
collateralization is naturally the lender’s most preferred enforcement mechanism because it
is virtually costless to employ, it has typically been limited in use because of the difficulty in
finding an asset large enough to outweigh the benefit of default to the borrower. With US
Treasury securities, however, the lender can directly supply collateral in proportion to the
loan.
Panel (a) in Figure 5 plots US Treasury security holdings against outstanding dollar credit
for the countries included in our sample and illustrates a pronounced, positive relationship
between US Treasury security holdings and outstanding dollar credit. It is clear, however,
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that China is not only an outlier but also seems to be driving the slope of the fitted line. Panel
(b) demonstrates that even when China is omitted from our sample of countries, however,
US Treasury securities and outstanding dollar credit continue to be positively related.
To empirically investigate whether US Treasury securities serve as collateral to dollar
borrowing, we focus on the stylized fact that most foreign holdings of US Treasury secu-
rities are in long-term securities held by official institutions (i.e., central banks) as foreign
exchange reserves (Gourinchas and Rey, 2014; Sunner, 2017).7 We use this fact to model the
decision to hold long-term US Treasury securities as one to hold dollars as opposed to other
feasible currencies (the Euro, Pound Sterling, and Japanese Yen) in foreign exchange re-
serves, which allows us to draw from well-developed models of the latter dynamic.8 We then
use a first-difference estimator to control for country-specific factors affecting US Treasury
security holdings in a panel of developing and emerging-market economies. To incorporate a
persistence effect of US Treasury security holdings, we introduce as a regressor the dependent
variable lagged by one period and estimate the regression equation using an instrumental
variable (IV) method.
Our results demonstrate that even after controlling for a persistence effect (i.e., inertia)
in US Treasury security holdings, increases in outstanding dollar credit are related to a
statistically significant (p < 0.01) increase in holdings of US Treasury securities. Specifically,
the estimated increase in US Treasury security holdings related to a $1 billion increase in
outstanding dollar credit is $0.11 billion, all other factors held constant. Our result is robust
to outliers. Namely, our results are not driven by China’s disproportionate holdings of US
7See Figure 2 in Chapter 1 of this dissertation for an illustration of this stylized fact.
8Our approach follows that taken by Ito, Jongwanich, and Terada-Hagiwara (2009) and Terada-Hagiwara
(2011). Our selection of feasible alternatives to the US dollar in foreign exchange reserves is informed by the
currencies included in the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights which is composed of the
most widely used currencies in global trading and financial systems. We do not include the Chinese Yuan
as an alternative to the dollar because our data set spans 2003Q1-2016Q4 and the Yuan was only added to
Special Drawing Rights’ basket of currencies in the last quarter of 2016.
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Treasury securities and outstanding dollar credit. In fact, when China is removed from the
sample and our empirical model estimated again, the relationship between outstanding dollar
credit on holdings of US Treasury securities increases in statistical significance (p < 0.001)
and magnitude. Specifically, when China is removed from the sample, a $1 billion increase in
outstanding dollar credit is associated with a $0.18 billion increase in US Treasury securities,
all other factors held constant.
Our results are non-trivial, especially given the magnitude of US Treasury security and
outstanding dollar credit holdings, as reported in Table 1. Generally speaking, a $1 billion
increase in outstanding dollar credit is minimal given that the mean level of outstanding
dollar credit and US Treasury security holdings in our sample of developing and emerging
economy countries is approximately $91.5 billion and $105.2 billion, respectively. In more
recent years (2010-2016), the average yearly increase in outstanding dollar credit among
countries in our sample is $14.5 billion when China is included and $9.2 billion when it is
not. Perhaps more tellingly, outstanding dollar credit in each sample country has grown
during the period 2003Q1-2016Q4 by approximately $115 billion on average.9
We also find that with the exception of outstanding dollar credit and the relative yield
on long-term US Treasury securities, none of our explanatory variables are . statistically
significant when China is included in our sample. Because our analysis compares the US
to other nations or regions which might reasonably also issue safe assets (the Euro Area,
United Kingdom, and Japan), this result challenges the notion presented in the Safe Assets
theory that standard determinants of asset selection, including debt capacity, are operative
in the selection between safe assets.
Finally, while our motivating question is specific to developing and emerging market
9If China is omitted from our sample, then the level of outstanding dollar credit in 2016Q4 is approxi-
mately $84.8 billion higher on average than it was in 2003Q1.
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economy holdings of US Treasury securities, the role of these securities in foreign exchange
reserves also allows our results to provide insight on the global role of the dollar generally.
Indeed, our assumption that holdings of long-term US Treasury securities effectively repre-
sent the dollar composition of foreign exchange reserves allows us to work around the highly
confidential nature of this data.10 Though a detailed review of the literature on the currency
composition of foreign exchange reserves is beyond the scope of this paper, a central concept
emerging from it is that the global role of a currency is strongly dictated by its use as a
reserve currency.11 Thus, the research on determinants of reserve currency choice is typi-
cally part of a larger effort to develop insights on the continued dominance of a particular
currency, usually the dollar.12
Contrary to the Safe Assets theory that envisions continued financing of the US deficit as
teetering on a knife-edge and related research in the currency composition of foreign reserves
that warns of a spontaneous demise in the international role of the dollar, our results suggest
that these fears may be less than warranted. Specifically, if holdings of US Treasury securities
and the global role of the dollar are driven at least in part by outstanding dollar credit, then
naturally the former are at least partially dependent on demand for dollar credit and the
ability of the US to provide it.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the determinants of demand for US
Treasury securities. Section 2.3 presents our variables and describes the data. Section 2.4
presents our econometric model and describes our estimation strategy. In Section 2.5, we
10A number of researchers have commented on the unavailability of country-level data on the currency
composition of foreign exchange reserves (Truman and Wong, 2006; Galati and Woolridge, 2006; Eichengreen,
Chitu and Mehl, 2016; Sunner, 2017). The closest alternative is the IMF’s Currency Composition of Official
Foreign Exchange Reserve (COFER) data—discontinued in 2015—which disaggregates by country groupings
(advanced and developing/emerging) annually for the period 1995-1998 and quarterly for the period 1999Q1-
2015Q2.
11An older but excellent treatment can be found in Prem (1994).
12See, for instance, Krugman (1984), Prem (1994), Chinn and Frankel (2005), Eichengreen, Chitu and
Mehl (2016), Eichengreen, Mehl and Chitu (2017).
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present our results using a first-difference and IV strategy for samples including and omitting
China (an outlier). Section 2.6 presents the results from a series of robustness checks. Section
2.7 concludes.
2.2 Determinants of Demand for US Treasury Securities
Owing to the role of US Treasury securities in the foreign exchange reserves of developing
and emerging market economies, demand for these financial assets are typically modeled as
a preference to hold dollars in foreign exchange reserves. Likewise, determinants of US
Treasury security demand can properly be considered synonymous with determinants of the
currency composition of foreign exchange reserves. We exploit this fact to model the demand
for US Treasury securities as demand for dollars in foreign exchange reserves.
Empirical efforts to determine whether a variable acts as a determinant of the currency
composition of foreign exchange reserves typically introduces it as a regressor among a set of
standard determinants (Prem, 1994; Eichengreen, Mehl and Chitu, 2017). These standard
determinants, or factors conventionally believed to affect the currency composition of foreign
exchange reserves, are theorized to operationalize more general motivations among foreign
official institutions of reducing transaction costs and preserving a store of value. That is,
those currencies that are disproportionately held in foreign exchange reserves are generally
theorized to be those that are most stable and least costly, and the standard determinants
are those which signal these qualities in a currency. These standard determinants typically
account for the following characteristics of issuing countries: financial depth, exchange rate,
trade relations, and inertia.
Deeper financial markets are understood to be more resilient and better able to lower
transaction costs of a currency. More specifically, deep financial markets are theorized to
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facilitate better absorption of adverse shocks through diversification of risk, thus enhancing
stability (Prem, 1994; Sahay et al., 2015). One particularly popular proxy for financial
depth is the ratio of broad money to GDP (Eichengreen, Chitu and Mehl, 2016).13 Though
its attractiveness as a measure is likely owing at least in part to data availability, the ratio
of broad money to GDP is also lacking as a proxy for financial depth. Specifically, the
ratio of broad money to GDP more appropriately acts as a proxy for the depth of financial
institutions in a given country but ignores the depth of financial markets in the same. A
more robust measure of financial depth should also account for the depth of financial markets
in a given country by incorporating the level of a country’s domestic private credit, stock
market capitalization and bond market capitalization relative to a country’s GDP (King and
Levine, 1993; Chinn and Frankel, 2005; Cihak, Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen and Levine, 2012).
A currency’s exchange rate reflects the degree to which a currency is a stable source
of value.14 The intuition is straightforward: if a financial asset is held in a currency that
depreciates, then its holders will be repaid in currency worth relatively less than it had been
at the time the asset was initially invested in; as a consequence, the financial asset will yield
less of a return than was originally anticipated by the investor.
The most efficient way of measuring the stability of a currency is to measure its exchange
rate against the Special Drawing Rights (SDR), an international reserve asset created by the
IMF (Chinn and Frankel, 2005; Eichengreen, Chitu and Mehl, 2016). The value of the SDR
is determined by a weighted average of the currencies where the assigned weights correspond
to a currency’s importance in global finance and trade. The exchange rate of a currency to
the SDR is calculated on the basis of its dollar exchange rate; that is, a given currency is
13Typically, M3 is preferred as a measure of broad money but where data on M3 is not available, M2 has
been utilized instead (King and Levine, 1993).
14Thus, later in section 2.3, we view our variable capturing the exchange rate of the dollar as operational-
izing the latter’s stability.
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first converted to dollars and then to SDRs using the latter’s value against the dollar. As a
result, this method has the advantage of comparing the value of the dollar not only relative
to any currency of notable importance in global finance and trade but also in proportion to
this importance. For instance, if the dollar depreciates against any of the currencies included
in the currency basket comprising the SDR, the dollar will depreciate against the SDR and
in proportion to the importance of the currency it has depreciated against, offering a more
robust measure of currency stability.
Though goods trade is typically associated with the private sector, the currency compo-
sition of a country’s foreign exchange reserves is understood to reflect international trade
relations. This reflection is mostly owing to efforts by central banks in developing and
emerging market economies to manage the domestic exchange rate. Thus, central banks in
developing and emerging market economies are prompted to hold in its foreign exchange
reserves that currency which is commonly used in international trade transactions.
Recently, research on the determinants of an international currency has attributed a
greater weight to an issuing country’s overall size in international trade networks than indi-
vidual trade ties. That is, countries are increasingly less likely to hold the currencies of their
trade partners simply on account of the partnership and more likely to hold the currency
of a country dominant in international trade networks. Empirical evidence of this reality
and especially in favor of the dollar is relatively easy to see: for instance, Goldberg and
Tille (2008) show that while dollar-use varies across countries, its prevalence is high even in
non-US transactions, so that the role of the dollar is larger than can be explained by the
number of US trade partners.
The use of the US dollar in non-US transactions can be explained by way of a network
effect whereby transaction costs are lowered by using the US dollar as a vehicle currency, or
as a medium of exchange between currencies (Krugman, 1979; Portes, Rey and Oh, 2001;
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Devereux and Shi, 2013). The network effect of currencies is essentially an economies of
scale argument: as the number and scale of a country A’s international trade ties grows, so
do the cost advantages to its trade partners of transacting in country A’s currency. That is,
if countries B and C are weaker trade partners of each other than either are of country A,
then transacting in country A’s currency allows countries B and C to avoid costs associated
with exchanging their own respective currencies for country A’s currency.15
Additionally, using the currency of the largest issuer is convenient in the sense that
it obviates the need, which is sometimes costly, of acquiring information about multiple
currencies. Thus, assuming that countries prefer to use a currency that minimizes transaction
costs and that the latter is inversely proportional to the volume of transactions, then countries
will opt to use the currency of leading trade nations and this result will be self-reinforcing as
more countries follow suit (Krugman, 1979, 1984). A common proxy for a country’s role in
international trade networks is its economic size, or share of world GDP (Chinn and Frankel,
2005).
Portes, Rey and Oh (2001) demonstrate the network effects of a currency by focusing
on foreign exchange markets, assuming transactions occur through a financial intermediary,
and modeling gains as those costs that would otherwise have to be spent on additional
intermediary services if a vehicle currency was not used. She finds that a country’s position
in international trade networks largely determines whether its currency serves as a vehicle
currency. Devereux and Shi (2013) confirm that Rey’s results do not depend on the existence
of a financial intermediary since vehicle currencies facilitate international trade by lowering
the average cost of currency trade between countries.
Because the benefit of adopting a currency is partly owing to the network made up of
other users, it is possible for the network to outlast its original generating source because
15This is essentially a restatement of the argument made in Krugman (1984).
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the cost-benefit of ubiquity acts as a buffer against loss. That is, network effects may give a
currency inertia or persistence (Triffin, 1960; Krugman, 1979, 1984; Eichengreen, Mehl and
Chitu, 2017). To illustrate the dynamic, consider a simple thought experiment: let x be
the benefit to country B from holding country A’s currency owing to the latter’s intrinsic
characteristics and let y be the benefit from holding country A’s currency simply because
it is widely used. Then, country B will continue to hold country A’s currency even if x
declines, so long as x≤y.16
Country B’s willingness to continue holding country A’s currency even after x declines
indicates that a particular currency (or, in this analysis, US Treasury securities) exhibits
inertia. Importantly, though network effects may elicit an inertial force in a currency, they
are not unique in this regard. Inertia may also be caused by habit formation or lack of better
alternatives (Eichengreen, Mehl and Chitu, 2017). We might even consider that the Safe
Assets theory has added another reason that an asset may exhibit inertia: it is perceived
to be “safe.” Where some measure or share of a currency is a regressand in an empirical
exercise, its inertia is typically captured through a lagged dependent variable included as a
regressor (Chinn and Frankel, 2005; Chitu, Eichengreen and Mehl, 2014; Eichengreen, Mehl
and Chitu, 2017).
One critique of explaining currency use by way of the latter’s inertia is that inertia is
exactly what is to be explained.17 That is, practically speaking, including a variable rep-
resenting inertia as a regressor simply captures whatever variation in the level or share of
16The continued dominance of the pound sterling as a global currency during World War II serves as a
prime example of this phenomenon (Aliber, 1966; Krugman, 1979).
17Echoing this sentiment, Edwin M. Truman writes of Chinn and Frankel (2005), “The Chinn and Frankel
results confirm the well-known observation that there is substantial inertia in international reserve holdings.
The issue is what explains this inertia” (Chinn and Frankel, 2005, p.329). Similarly, Prem (1994) asserts, “We
take issue with the convention[al] approach to inertia, on grounds that by dismissing anomalies as remnants
of past conventions, it merely serves to justify the status quo and hardly offers any real explanation. It fails
to specify the dynamics—how long before a break in the old convention might be expected, and in particular,
what might cause this transition” (p.33).
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currency holdings that cannot be explained by the variation in the explanatory variables.
Nevertheless, empirical studies confirm that what has been designated inertia is indeed an
important determinant of the currency composition of foreign exchange reserves. Chinn and
Frankel (2005) empirically assess determinants of reserve currencies to determine whether
the dollar would maintain its status as a key international reserve currency following the
euro’s introduction. The authors utilize a logistic model and test the following determinants
of reserve currency status: inertia, income share and financial depth of an issuing country,
the exchange rate, and network externalities (i.e., network effects). Their results suggest that
inertia exercises a statistically significant (p < 0.10) and large effect on the currency compo-
sition of reserves; specifically, inertia propels forward approximately 90% of each currency
in foreign exchange reserves from one year to the next.
It is also worth mentioning that Chinn and Frankel’s (2005) findings also support the
statistical significance at the 10% level of an issuer’s income share and a currency’s exchange
rate as determinants. Interestingly, financial depth measured through a series of financial
market capitalization to GDP ratios is not only statistically insignificant but also possesses
an unexpected negative sign.
In sum, the demand for US Treasury securities can properly be modeled after the de-
mand for the US dollar in foreign exchange reserves. This equivalency is owing to the stylized
fact that that most foreign-held US Treasury securities are held by official institutions (i.e.,
central banks) as foreign exchange reserves. Generally speaking, foreign official institutions
seek currencies as foreign exchange reserves that are stable and minimize transaction costs;
thus, the determinants of the currency composition of foreign exchange reserves (or, equiv-
alently, foreign demand for US Treasury securities) are those that signal these qualities in a
currency. Empirical exercises testing whether a variable can be considered a determinant of
the currency composition of foreign exchange reserves typically introduces the variable as a
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regressor among standard determinants: financial depth of an issuing country, a currency’s
exchange rate, the issuer’s position in international trade networks, and inertia of currency
use.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.3.1 Dependent Variable: Foreign Holdings of Long-term US Treasury Secu-
rities (USTSit)
Long-term US Treasury security holdings for country i at time t is the dependent variable
in our empirical analysis and is represented by the variable USTSit. To recall, our goal is to
determine what motivates developing and emerging market economies to hold US sovereign
debt where we hypothesize the reason to be demand for dollar credit. Thus, while it is not
necessary that we focus on long-term Treasury securities since our analysis seeks to under-
stand the motivations of holding US sovereign debt generally, doing so offers an advantage.
Foreign holdings of Treasury securities are overwhelmingly in long-term securities and for-
eign official investors hold the largest proportion of the latter as foreign exchange reserves.
Thus, focusing exclusively on long-term Treasury securities allows us to better account for
unobserved heterogeneity across countries by controlling for the well-defined determinants
of currency composition in foreign exchange reserves.18
The link between long-term Treasury securities and foreign exchange reserves can be
made stronger still if we could focus exclusively on that portion of the former that are
held by foreign official institutions. Unfortunately, however, country-level data on foreign
official holdings of long-term Treasury securities is unavailable, likely reflecting the highly
18Specifically, we draw from the models of Chinn and Frankel (2005) and Eichengreen, Mehl and Chitu
(2017).
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confidential nature of currency compositions of foreign exchange reserves by country. Thus,
we follow Terada-Hagiwara (2011) in using long-term Treasury securities as a proxy for
foreign official holdings.
Data on US Treasury security holdings by country is from Bertaut and Judson (2017)
which offers monthly U.S. cross-border securities holdings for 92 countries and 6 regions.
The Bertaut and Judson data is a substantial improvement from the more conventional
source for this data, the Treasury International Capital (TIC) System. Most importantly,
the Bertaut and Judson data reports country holdings of US Treasury securities adjusted
for valuation effects, or changes in reported positions resulting from a simple change in the
market price of a security. Despite this strength, however, it is important to point out that
one weakness of the Bertaut Judson data (shared with its TIC counterpart) is that it suffers
from custodial bias whereby custodians of an asset are assumed to be its owner (Bertaut and
Judson, 2014, p.10). Because country-level positions in US Treasury securities are reported
on a geographical basis (i.e., an asset is assumed to reside with its owner), a weakness of our
data is that some country holdings may be underestimated.19
2.3.2 Independent Variable of Interest: Outstanding Dollar Credit (CREDit)
Outstanding dollar credit for country i at time t is the independent variable of interest
and is represented by the variable CREDit. Dollar credit to developing and emerging market
economies is specifically measured as total dollar credit to non-bank borrowers and is taken
from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
Country-level data on outstanding credit is available at different frequencies and for
19Bertaut and Judson (2014) offer the following example to illustrate the problem of custodial bias: ”If
a Russian investor chooses to hold the securities with a custodian in the United Kingdom, the liability
would be recorded against the United Kingdom rather than Russia. As a result, the total liability position
worldwide is correct, but the geographic allocation is not” (Bertaut and Judson, 2014, p.10). Further, it
is useful to point out that while some country positions may be underestimated, we do not anticipate any
being overestimated as no country included in our data set houses large custodians.
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a number of sources including the World Bank, the BIS, and the International Financial
Statistics database published by the IMF. Data on the currency composition of this credit,
however, is only provided by the BIS and for non-bank borrowers in each country. We utilize
the most comprehensive measure on foreign-currency credit offered by BIS which combines
international debt securities, cross-border bank loans and local bank loans.
Because country-level data on local bank loans in foreign currency is difficult to procure,
BIS only reports outstanding foreign currency credit for fourteen developing and emerging
market economies, one of which (Saudi Arabia) is only included from 2013 onwards.20 Thus,
data on outstanding dollar credit contributed the most to constraining the cross-sectional
units of our first panel to thirteen countries.
2.3.3 Independent Control Variables
2.3.3.1 Relative Financial Depth of the US (DEPTHt)
Financial depth of the US at time t relative to what we will call its currency competitors—
the Euro Area (EA), the United Kingdom (UK), and Japan (JP)—is represented by the
variable DEPTHt.
21 Including this variable among our regressors controls for the possibility
that the US attracts investment in its sovereign debt because it possesses the deepest financial
markets among a set of feasible alternatives (Portes and Rey, 1998; Papaioannou and Portes,
2008; Chinn and Frankel, 2005; Eichengreen, Mehl and Chitu, 2017).
Financial depth for each currency competitor is defined and measured as the sum of a
country j’s domestic private credit (DPRIVjt), stock market capitalization (SCAPjt), and
bond market capitalization (BCAPjt) relative to GDP (GDPt) at time t.
22 Domestic private
20These fourteen economies are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico,
Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Taiwan, and Turkey.
21See footnote 8 for our rationale in selecting these currencies to be the US’ “currency competitors.”
22To clarify, the subscript i will be used to denote a developing and emerging market economy and the
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credit is operationalized using all credit to the private non-financial sector from banks.
Stock market capitalization typically refers to a specific company and is simply the prod-
uct of a company’s outstanding total shares and the current market price of one share.
Broadened to the country or regional level (as it is in this analysis), stock market capitaliza-
tion refers to the sum of outstanding shares listed on a stock exchange(s) multiplied by their
respective current market prices. Stock market capitalization for the US, the UK, Japan,
and the Euro Area is calculated using the New York Stock Exchange, the London Stock
Exchange, Japan Exchange Group Inc., and Euronext, respectively.23 Data on these stock
market exchanges is obtained from the World Federation of Exchanges. Quarterly data on
bond market capitalization proved difficult to secure so we operationalized this variable using
the commonly utilized proxy of outstanding domestic debt securities issued by financial and
non-financial corporations; data is from the BIS.
Once financial depth for the US and each of its currency competitors is ascertained,
relative financial depth for the US is then measured by the difference between its measure
for financial depth and the maximum value of financial depth found among its currency
competitors. DEPTHt is therefore given by,
DEPTHt = FINUS,t −max{FINEA,t, F INUK,t, F INJP,t} (2.1)
where
FINjt =
DPRIVjt + SCAPjt +BCAPjt
GDPjt
The subscript j denotes one of the US’ currency competitors (EA, UK, or JP). Thus, the
subscript j will be used to denote a country (or region) that is a US currency competitor.
23Japan Exchange Group, Inc. was formed by the merger of the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the Osaka
Securities Exchange. Thus, prior to 2014, stock market capitalization for Japan was measured as the sum
of stock market capitalization for the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the Osaka Securities Exchange.
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proper way to understand, say, a positive value X for DEPTHt, is as follows: in period t,
the US financial depth to GDP ratio is X percentage points above the maximum financial
depth to GDP ratio found between the Euro Area, the United Kingdom, and Japan.
Perhaps surprisingly, it should be noted that the values for DEPTHt are negative across
all time periods. That is, the US is not the most financially developed country among its
currency competitors during the observed time period; in fact, it is the least financially
developed of this group for much of the observed period. This result remains if we utilize
the ratio of broad money to GDP as a proxy for financial depth instead. Though it is clear
that financial depth of the US is not significant as a determinant of US Treasury security
holdings in an absolute sense, we still include the variable as a control in case variations in
relative US financial depth can help to explain variations in holdings.
2.3.3.2 Stability (EXCHt)
Stability at time t is represented by the variable EXCHt and refers to the stability of
the currency in which a financial asset is denominated at time t. Stability is included in our
empirical model to control for the possibility that developing and emerging market economies
simply prefer to hold financial assets that are stable sources of value. We define EXCHt as
the USD to SDR exchange rate at time t.
To capture the probable reality that changes in currency stability will not immediately
yield changes in holdings of financial assets denominated in those currencies, we utilize a
5-year moving average of the USD to SDR exchange rate in our construction of this variable.
Data is from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database published by the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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2.3.3.3 Network Effects (NETWt)
Network Effects is represented by the variable NETWt and is representative of the eco-
nomic size of the US (operationalized by the ratio of US GDP to world GDP) relative to the
economic size of its currency competitors (operationalized as the ratio of a country j’s GDP
to world GDP). The introduction of NETWt as a regressor in the model controls for the
possibility that the variation in holdings of US Treasury securities in our sample of countries
is owing to changes in the relative economic size of the US.
The relative advantage of the US in terms of its network effect is given by the difference
between its economic size and the economic size of its currency competitors. That is,
NETWt = RATIOUS,t −max{RATIOEA,t, RATIOUK,t, RATIOJP,t} (2.2)
where
RATIOjt =
Country j’s GDP at time t
World GDP at time t
Quarterly data on world GDP is unavailable and so had to be constructed by aggregating
quarterly GDP at market exchange rates for individual countries, based on data availability.
Data is taken from the International Financial Statistics database published by the IMF,
the FRED database, and CEIC data. World GDP is comprised of 53 countries, 28 of which
are classified as advanced economies by the International Monetary Fund.24
24The countries used to calculate world GDP are as follows: Albania, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada,
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia,
Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, South
Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States,
and Euro Area countries.
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2.3.3.4 Inertia (USTSi,t−1)
Inertia or persistence in holdings of US Treasury securities for country i is represented
by the USTSit variable lagged by one period (i.e, USTSi,t−1). Including this variable among
our regressors controls for the possibility that current holdings of US Treasury securities are
simply reflections of past holdings.
One critique, mentioned previously, of our inclusion of a variable representing inertia of
US Treasury securities holdings is that inertia is exactly what is to be explained. While we
agree that USTSi,t−1 is something of a catchall that is unsatisfactory for its vagueness, we
also consider it plausible that at least some of the variation in US Treasury security holdings
is owing to one if not more of the factors manifested in an inertial quality. Prudence therefore
requires that these factors be controlled for, though to reconcile the conflict we first estimate
a regression equation omitting USTSi,t−1 as a control variable.
2.3.3.5 Yield(Y IELDt)
Yield at time t is represented by the variable Y IELDt. Including this variable among
our regressors controls for the possibility that the variation in our dependent variable is
simply owing to US Treasury securities offering investors a higher yield than other feasible
alternatives (i.e., the yield on long-term sovereign debt of US currency competitors). Though
return considerations of foreign official institutions are not typically included as a determi-
nant of the currency composition of foreign exchange reserves in relevant empirical models,
it is plausible that these considerations become important in the selection between safe as-
sets. Data is obtained from FRED. To capture the yield of long-term US Treasury securities
relative to feasible alternatives, Y IELDt is calculated as the difference between the yield on
long-term US Treasury securities and the maximum yield on long-term government bonds
found among the Euro Area, United Kingdom, and Japan. Y IELDt is therefore given by,
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Y IELDt = GOVUS,t −max{GOVEA,t, GOVUK,t, GOVJP,t} (2.3)
where
GOVjt = Nominal yield at time t for country j’s 10-year government bond
2.3.4 Summary
Table 3.1 contains descriptive statistics for the main variables. The sample is a balanced
panel for the period 2003-2016 at quarterly intervals. For country-variant variables (USTSit,
USTSi,t−1, CREDit), data is collected for 13 developing and emerging market economies
based on data availability.25
25The countries included are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Republic
of Korea, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, and Turkey.
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2.4 Econometric Model
The econometric model which will serve as the basis for the analysis when we do not
include inertia of US Treasury security holdings (USTSi,t−1) as an explanatory variable is
given by,
USTSit = γCREDit + x
′
tβ + αi + µt + uit (2.4)
where USTSit is holdings of long-term US Treasury securities for country i in period
t and CREDit—our variable of interest—is total outstanding dollar credit to non-bank
borrowers for country i in period t. The parameter γ therefore measures the magnitude of
the relationship between outstanding dollar credit and holdings of US Treasury securities.
Further, x
′
t is a vector comprised of our control variables listed in Section 2.3.3, αi is an
unobserved effect capturing all unobserved, time-invariant factors affecting our dependent
variable, and µt is a complete set of time effects accounting for secular changes in US Treasury
security holdings. If our hypothesis that US Treasury securities serve as collateral to dollar
credit is correct, then we would expect the coefficient on CREDit to be statistically significant
and positive.
Further, given our efforts to tailor foreign holdings of US Treasury securities to a model of
currency composition in foreign exchange reserves, it is perhaps useful at this point to clarify
how a positive and statistically significant coefficient on CREDit relates to the public and
private domains. To this end, consider Table 2 illustrating the distinction between private
and public holdings of US Treasury securities and private and public dollar borrowing.
Using Table 2, we can say that our analysis practically applies to cases (A) and (B); that
is, a statistically significant coefficient on CREDit will indicate that there is a statistically
significant relationship between private and public dollar borrowing and public holdings of
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Table 2: Public versus Private Borrowers and Holders
Dollar Borrowers
Public Private
Collateral Providers
Public A B
Private C D
Notes: Collateral providers refers to holders of US Treasury
securities. Case (A) refers to public dollar borrowers and public
collateral providers. Case (B) refers to private dollar borrowers
and public collateral providers. Case (C) refers to public dollar
borrowers and private collateral providers. Case (D) refers to
private dollar borrowers and private collateral providers.
US Treasury securities in the developing and emerging market economies included in our
sample (all other factors held constant.)26
To continue explanation of our empirical model, when our inertia variable (USTSi,t−1) is
omitted, the model is best estimated simply using a first differences estimator. Given that
the unit of analysis is developing and emerging market economies, we cannot reasonably
adopt the crucial assumption needed for a random effects model that we have sufficiently
controlled for all sources of variation in the dependent variable such that there exists no αi
whereby Cov(αi, xit) 6= 0. For instance, perhaps the form of government in a developing or
emerging-market economy is correlated with dollar credit and the currency denomination of
financial assets and liabilities. The main point here is that though we cannot be certain of
the omitted, country-specific factors that would bias our results, the fact that such factors
are likely to exist given such large geographical units of observation renders the use of a
26We should note that because our data on US Treasury securities does not distinguish between public and
private foreign holdings of US Treasury securities by country, our analysis technically also applies to cases (B)
and (D). But, as previously mentioned, the overwhelming majority of long-term US Treasury securities are
held by Central Banks in foreign exchange reserves, which we can exploit to restrict the practical application
of our results to cases (A) and (B).
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random effects estimator inappropriate for our current analysis.
A consideration in choosing between the fixed effects and first differences model is that the
number of cross-sectional units (countries) is less than the time periods per cross-sectional
unit (i.e., N < T ), meaning that non-stationarity of the data presents a more serious chal-
lenge to the estimation process. We thusly stationarize our variables. A standard test for
stationarity of a time series, say y, is the Augmented Dickey Fuller Test (ADF) which tests
the estimated coefficient θˆ in the model,
4yt = α + δt+ θyt−1 +
h∑
l=1
γl4yt−1 + ut (2.5)
where h = p − 1 and δt are the deterministic components of the model. The goal is to
determine whether stationarity of the series has been achieved for p lags of y. While the
ADF is suitable for pooled cross-sections, panel data requires that we establish stationarity
of the time series for each cross-sectional unit N . That is, equation (2.5) becomes,
4yit = δit+ θiyi,t−1 +
h∑
l=1
γil4yi,t−1 + uit (2.6)
Both Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) consider equation
(2.6) above and propose applying the ADF test to the null hypothesis H0 : θit = 0, or
that the series has a unit root.27 Table 3 presents our results from performing the ADF,
Levin-Lin-Chu, and Im-Pesaran-Shin tests to all of our main variables in equation (2.4).
The test results presented favor adopting a first-differences model since our variables in
both panels (with and without China included as an observation) are integrated of order one,
or I(1), suggesting that first-differencing the series is likely to result in stationarity. Further,
inspection of the residuals generated by estimating the original model given in equation (2.4)
27The main difference between the Levin-Lin-Chu and Im-Pesaran-Shin tests is that in the former, θi is
assumed to be the same for all cross-sectional units whereas in the latter, θi is permitted to vary.
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Table 3: Panel unit root tests
Level Augmented Dickey Fuller Levin-Lin-Chu Im-Pesaran-Shin
1st Difference Test Statistic Test Statistic Test Statistic
USTSit −3.246 1.870 2.009
∆USTSit −3.960∗∗ −17.808∗∗∗ −13.938∗∗∗
CREDit −3.287 8.289 4.278
∆CREDit −4.102∗∗∗ −14.553∗∗∗ −22.025∗∗∗
EXCHt −6.261∗∗∗ −0.716 −2.726
∆EXCHt −6.537∗∗∗ −3.194∗∗∗ −14.766∗∗∗
DEPTHt −10.540∗∗∗ −2.132∗ −9.285∗∗∗
∆DEPTHt −10.816∗∗∗ −20.918∗∗∗ −18.032∗∗∗
NETWt −9.484∗∗∗ 1.994 1.068
∆NETWt −9.728∗∗∗ −17.98∗∗∗ −14.663∗∗∗
YIELDt −5.855∗∗∗ −4.186∗∗∗ 2.696
∆YIELDt −5.729∗∗∗ −21.429∗∗∗ −18.867∗∗∗
Notes: Lag orders are chosen to minimize the Bayesian information criterion. Statistical signif-
icance of the test statistic indicates rejection of the null hypothesis that the series follows a unit
root process.
∗∗∗p<0.001; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗p<0.05
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for panel A and B indicates that uit in both cases follows a random walk process so that first
differencing equation (2.4) is likely to remove serial correlation from our error term.
Thus, to determine the effect of dollar credit holdings on US Treasury security holdings
when inertia of the latter is not included as an explanatory variable, we estimate the following
model:
4USTSit = γ4CREDit +4x′tβ +4µt +4uit (2.7)
Equation (2.7) is simply the result of time-differencing equation (2.4), which necessarily
removes the unobserved heterogeneity, αi.
When inertia or persistence of our dependent variable, US Treasury security holdings
(USTSi,t−1), enters into our analysis, equation (2.4) becomes,
USTSit = θUSTSi,t−1 + γCREDit + x
′
tβ + αi + µt + uit (2.8)
Naturally, transforming equation (2.8) by time-differencing prior to estimation may seem
like an appropriate strategy given that panels A and B are first-difference stationary and that
the residuals generated by estimating equation (2.4) follow a random walk process. While
first-differencing equation (2.8) is certainly needed for the preceding reasons, introduction
of a lagged dependent variable among our regressors requires that we slightly modify our
former approach. To elucidate, consider first differencing equation (2.8) which results in the
following model,
4USTSit = θ4USTSi,t−1 + γ4CREDit +4x′tβ +4µt +4uit (2.9)
Notice that using OLS to estimate equation (2.9) will not result in a consistent estimation
since USTSi,t−1 is used to generate the residuals ut−1 and, by extension, 4uit; thus, the
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requisite assumption that our residuals be uncorrelated with the regressors in the model, is
violated. We therefore adopt the method proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) whereby
4USTSi,t−2 is used to instrument for 4USTSi,t−1 in equation (2.9).28
2.5 Main Results
Our results are presented in Table 4 along with robust standard errors (clustered at the
country level for estimates reported in columns [2]-[4]). Each specification uses a full set of
time dummies among the explanatory variables to control for any variation in holdings of
US Treasury securities among developing and emerging-market economies that is owing to
a time-dependent effect.
28We follow the procedure outlined in Woodridge (2010) according to which we must confirm that the
proposed variable (4USTSi,t−2) serves as a proper instrument for the variable in question (4USTSi,t−1).
This determination can easily be made by estimating the model, 4USTSi,t−1 = β4USTSi,t−2 + uit for
i = 1, 2, . . . , N. Results from estimation of the preceding model for panels 1 and 2 are reported in Table 16
of Appendix A and indicate that 4USTSi,t−2 is indeed a good instrument for 4USTSi,t−1 in both cases.
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Column (1) of Table 4 reports the results from estimating a standard pooled OLS re-
gression including all explanatory variables except inertia (USTSi,t−1) for panel A (where
observations for China are included.) Though the pooled OLS estimates cannot technically
be correct, they can still provide a useful baseline.29 The coefficient on the main variable
of interest, outstanding dollar credit (CREDit), is statistically significant (p < 0.001) and
positive, indicating that increases in holdings of US Treasury securities is associated with
an increase in outstanding dollar credit. Specifically, a $1 billion increase in outstanding
dollar credit is associated with a $2.1 billion increase in US Treasury security holdings, hold-
ing other factors fixed. This result supports our hypothesis but should be viewed with a
considerable degree of skepticism for reasons outlined in Section 2.4.
In addition to the main variable of interest, the financial depth of the US relative to its
currency competitors (DEPTHt) is significant at the 5% level but the coefficient estimate
has the “wrong” sign. Our coefficient estimate for DEPTHt indicates a negative relationship
between relative US financial depth and developing and emerging economy holdings of US
Treasury securities; specifically, a 1 percentage point increase in the relative financial depth
of the US is associated with a $0.64 billion decrease in US Treasury security holdings among
developing and emerging economy countries. Indeed, the coefficient estimates on all of
our control variables suggest counterintuitive relationships, though with the exception of
CREDit and DEPTHt, no other coefficient estimates from the pooled OLS are statistically
different from zero.
These counterintuitive results can be owing to a number of reasons including the omission
of an important explanatory variable, multicollinearity among regressors, and measurement
error. In our analysis, it is likely that the direction of the relationship between our control
29When stationarity of the variables is either achieved or not a concern in the case of a short panel, then
pooled OLS is especially useful: when compared to first differences or random effects, pooled OLS estimates
provide insight into the degree of bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity.
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variables and USTSit indicated is possibly owing to non-stationarity of the series (the conse-
quences of which are discussed in detail in Section 2.4), non-inclusion of a persistence effect
of US Treasury security holdings (represented by our variable USTSi,t−1), the inclusion of
China in our first panel which is an outlier both in terms of its holdings of US Treasury
securities and outstanding dollar credit, failure to remove unobserved heterogeneity, and/or
misguided economic theory. Before commenting further, we continue to our results from
estimating a first-differenced version of equation which necessarily resolves some of these
issues.
Column (2) presents our results from estimating equation (2.7) with robust standard
errors clustered by country. The coefficient on CREDit indicates that there is a positive,
statistically significant (p < 0.001) relationship between changes in a country’s outstanding
dollar credit and holdings of US Treasury securities; specifically, a $1 billion increase in
outstanding dollar credit is associated with a $0.28 billion increase in US Treasury security
holdings, all other factors held constant. Thus, our results from estimating equation (2.7)
confirm that the relationship between outstanding dollar credit and US Treasury securities
estimated by pooled OLS holds even after removing unobserved heterogeneity. Importantly,
compared to the results from pooled OLS, differencing has reduced the sensitivity between
changes in holdings of outstanding dollar credit and US Treasury securities by about $0.7
billion; that is, the same increase in outstanding dollar credit is associated with less of an
increase in US Treasury security holdings after unobserved heterogeneity is removed from
the estimating equation.
The first-differenced equation yields no statistically significant control variables and this
includes our formerly significant variable DEPTHt. While the coefficient estimates on most
of our control variables continue to have the “wrong” sign, the expected sign on our variable
NETWt is yielded through first-differencing. That is, the difference between the ratio of
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GDP to world GDP for the US and its currency competitors is associated with an increase
in US Treasury Security holdings among developing and emerging economies included in
our sample. One final observation is that, though not statistically significant, the coefficient
estimate on our stability variable EXCHt is relatively large and in an unexpected direction,
indicating that an increase in the weakness of the dollar relative to the SDR is associated
with an increase in US Treasury security holdings among developing and emerging economy
countries in our sample.
Results from introducing a persistence effect of US Treasury Securities are presented in
column (3). As discussed earlier, we instrument for the representative variable USTSi,t−1
with a second lag of USTSit to avoid a violation of the requisite assumption that our re-
gressors be uncorrelated with our error term. The coefficient on USTSi,t−1 indicates that
holdings of US Treasury security holdings indeed demonstrate strong and statistically signif-
icant (p < 0.001) inertia. Specifically, a $1 billion increase in US Treasury security holdings
is associated with a $0.72 billion increase in the next time period, all other factors held
constant.
Importantly, our results demonstrate that even after controlling for inertia in US Treasury
Security holdings, the coefficient on our main variable of interest, CREDit, continues to
be positive and statistically significant. However, CREDit displays slightly less statistical
significance, indicating that inertia has absorbed some of the variation in USTSit, formerly
attributed to outstanding dollar credit. Our variable CREDit is also reduced in magnitude
when a persistence effect of US Treasury securities is added to the model; specifically, the
estimated increase in US Treasury security holdings resulting from a $1 billion increase
in outstanding dollar credit is $0.11 billion, or approximately $0.17 billion lower than the
first-differences estimates, all other factors held constant.
The relationship between outstanding dollar credit and US Treasury security holdings
62
in our sample of developing and emerging market economies is non-trivial. Our descriptive
statistics reported in Table 1 indicate that, on average, countries in our sample hold ap-
proximately $91.5 billion dollars in outstanding dollar credit. Even when China is omitted
from the sample, the mean level of outstanding dollar credit is still large at approximately
$62.7 billion. More telling, however, is the growth rate of outstanding dollar credit over the
sample period. From 2003Q1-2016Q4, outstanding dollar credit in our sample of developing
and emerging market economies has grown by approximately $115 billion ($84.7 billion when
China is omitted). This growth has occurred at a higher rate in the later part of the sample
period (2010-2016) with countries in the sample adding on average about $14.5 billion per
year to their stock of outstanding dollar credit ($9.16 billion when China is omitted).
In 2016, developing and emerging market economies held roughly $3 trillion in US Trea-
sury securities. Our results indicate that if outstanding dollar credit among developing and
emerging market economies in our sample continues to grow at its more recent pace, then the
collateral needed to secure this credit will be roughly $188.5 billion in US Treasury securities
over the next decade.30 That is, holdings of US Treasury securities among developing and
emerging market economies will increase by roughly 6% over the next decade.
Echoing previous studies, the statistically significant coefficient on our lagged dependent
variable indicates that inertia or persistence in US Treasury security holdings is of consid-
erable magnitude: a $1 billion increase in US Treasury security holdings in the previous
time period is associated with a $0.64 billion increase in the current time period.31 To
put it simply, about half of US Treasury security holdings carried forward from one time
period to the next in developing and emerging market economies are propelled by inertia.
30To get this number, we simply multiply $14.5 billion in increased outstanding dollar credit per year by
13 (for the number of countries in the sample).
31Chinn and Frankel (2005) find that inertia explains approximately 90% of the currency composition
of reserves. Eichengreen, Mehl and Chitu (2017) estimate a considerably lower but statistically significant
effect of inertia that is closer to our estimate, at about 60%.
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With the exception of our variable representing inertia, our control variables continue to be
statistically insignificant, though now the coefficient on our variable representing stability
(EXCHt) possesses the conventionally expected sign. Interpreted causally, our results in-
dicate that a weaker dollar (measured against the SDR) yields a decrease in US Treasury
security holdings. Our coefficient estimates for the variables representing relative US fi-
nancial depth (DEPTHt) and relative US yield of long-term government bonds (Y IELDt),
however, continue to indicate an unexpected negative relationship with US Treasury security
holdings.
If conventional economic theory is to be our guide, the reasons underlying our unexpected
estimated signs on DEPTHt and Y IELDt are possibly owing to a mistake in our specifica-
tion, empirical strategy, and/or data set. We consider those factors that are plausibly related
to the current undertaking. Inspection of the correlation coefficients and variance inflation
factors (VIF) for the variables in our sample suggest that multicollinearity is unlikely to be
the cause of our unexpected signs on DEPTHt and Y IELDt.
32
Simultaneous-equations bias may be another reasonable concern if Y IELDt andDEPTHt,
respectively, are determined simultaneously with the dependent variable. That is, if foreign-
held US Treasury security holdings are determined by and determine Y IELDt and/or
DEPTHt, then our estimates will be biased and inconsistent. That portion of our variable
DEPTHt which might reasonably be determined by foreign-held, long-term US Treasury
securities is bond market capitalization. But, because we have proxied for this dimension of
DEPTHt with outstanding debt securities issued by the private sector, it is quite unlikely
that relative US financial depth would be determined by our dependent variable.
With regard to our variable Y IELDt, while we recognize that the yield on long-term US
32A formal presentation of our correlation matrix and variance inflation factors can be found in Tables 14
and 15, respectively, in Appendix A.
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Treasury securities is determined by demand for the latter (i.e., by holdings of US Treasury
Securities), recall that our variable Y IELDt represents the yield of long-term Treasury
securities relative to the yield on long-term government bonds of US currency competitors.
Additionally, to the extent that holdings of US Treasury securities may in fact determine the
yield on long-term US Treasury securities, it is plausible that it does so with a lag whereas
in our model the variables DEPTHt and Y IELDt are contemporaneous with each other.
Nevertheless, as an additional precautionary measure, we employ a Granger causality
test to assess whether the relative yield of US Treasury securities is determined by foreign
holdings of the same. Generally speaking, the Granger causality statistic allows us to test
whether past values of one variable, say Xt, is a significantly useful addition to a model using
past values of Yt to forecast Yt. If Xt is indeed a significantly useful addition (i.e., possesses
predictive content useful in forecasting Yt) beyond past values of Yt, then we conclude that Xt
“Granger causes” Yt. More specifically, consider the following time-series regression model
with one predictor, Xt:
Yt = β0 + βi
p∑
i=1
Yt−i + δi
q∑
i=1
Xt−i + ut (2.10)
where p and q are the lag order of Yt and Xt, respectively. Then, the Granger causality
statistic is simply an F-statistic generated to test the null hypothesis that the coefficients δi
in equation (2.10) are all zero.
As is well-known, the Granger causality test cannot determine contemporaneous causality
between two variables; that is, it cannot reveal information on whether the value of Xt in
period t is related to Yt in period t. But, applied to the current circumstance, it can provide
some useful insight because if Y IELDt is potentially determined by USTSt, then we would
reasonably expect past values of the latter to provide predictive content to forecast the
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former.
Our results from performing the Granger causality test are reported in Table 5 and indi-
cate that while the relative yield on US Treasury securities Granger causes foreign holdings
of long-term US Treasury securities, the reverse is not true. Because past values of USTSit
do not provide useful predictive content to forecast Y IELDt, we are unconvinced that simul-
taneity between the two is the cause of the unexpected estimated coefficients on our control
variables.
Table 5: Panel Granger Causality Test
Alternative Hypothesis F-statistic Direction of Granger-causality
USTS Granger-causes YIELD
for at least one country 1.487 USTS → YIELD
Y IELD Granger-causes USTS
for at least one country 2.297∗ YIELD → USTS
∆USTS Granger-causes ∆YIELD
for at least one country 1.432 ∆USTS → ∆YIELD
∆YIELD Granger-causes ∆USTS
for at least one country 2.629∗∗ ∆YIELD → ∆USTS
Notes: Significance of the F-statistic reported in the second column supports rejection of the null
hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis. For detailed data definitions and sources, see Table
12 in Appendix A. ∗∗∗p<0.001; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗p<0.05
Another reason that can possibly explain why our coefficient estimates on our variables
DEPTHt and Y IELDt do not possess the expected sign is the presence of outliers. Indeed,
Figure 5 clearly illustrates that China is an outlier in our sample in both its level of out-
standing dollar credit and holdings of US Treasury securities. Moreover, Figure 5 also seems
to indicate a strong positive relationship between the level of outstanding dollar credit and
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US Treasury securities for China; thus, we should be concerned that the presence of China
in our sample is not only driving unexpected signs in our coefficient estimates but also the
statistical significance of our main variable of interest, CREDit.
Thus, in the next section we remove China from our dataset and repeat our empirical
exercise to determine how sensitive our results are to the exclusion of this outlier. As an
additional precautionary measure, we also repeat the empirical analysis outlined in section
2.4 using an alternative definition of financial depth: the ratio of broad money (M3) to GDP.
2.6 Robustness Checks
Our first robustness exercise entails the removal of China as an observation in our sample
and estimating equations (2.4), (2.7), and (2.9) again following the same procedure outlined
in section 2.4. Our results are reported in columns (4)-(6) of Table 4.
A first observation is that while the estimated coefficient on our main variable of interest
CREDit is not significant in the pooled OLS regression reported in column (4), estimating
the first-differenced equation results in statistical significance being gained at the .1% level.
Thus, it seems that when China is removed from the sample, unobserved heterogeneity biases
our pooled OLS results to a considerably larger extent than when it is included. Interestingly,
comparison of the IV estimates presented in columns (3) and (6) indicate that when China is
omitted from our sample, CREDit gains in statistical significance (p < 0.001) and magnitude
by approximately $.07 billion. Specifically, when China is removed from the sample, a $1
billion increase in outstanding dollar credit is associated with a $0.18 billion increase in US
Treasury security holdings, all other factors held constant.
The gain in statistical significance of our outstanding dollar credit variable indicates that
though China holds a disproportionately high level of US Treasury securities and outstanding
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dollar credit, the link between the two is less strong for China than it is for other countries
included in our sample (i.e., outstanding dollar credit explains less of the variation in hold-
ings of US Treasury securities for China than it does for our other cross-sectional units.)
Relatedly, because the inertia of US Treasury security holdings seems to absorb more of the
variation in our dependent variable when China is included in the sample, it is possible that
inertia of US Treasury security holdings is relatively stronger for China.
The IV estimate of the coefficient on Y IELDt is now not only positive but also statisti-
cally significant at the 5% level.33 Specifically, our results indicate that a 1 percentage point
increase in the relative yield of long-term US Treasury securities is associated with a sizeable
$4.2 billion dollar increase in holdings of the same among developing and emerging market
economies countries included in the sample. Coupled with the potential that inertia plays
a larger role in motivating Chinese holdings of US Treasury securities, the significance of
the coefficient on Y IELDt for panel B hints that China’s motivation for accumulating US
Treasury securities is potentially unique and warranting of further research.
Notwithstanding Y IELDt, the IV estimates of the coefficients on our other control vari-
ables, reported in column (6), are not statistically significant. Moreover, the coefficient on
DEPTHt continues to be negative, indicating that increases in relative US financial depth
continue to be associated with decreases in US Treasury security holdings, even after omit-
ting outliers from the sample. The prevailing view argues that if the existence of a safe
asset is taken as given (i.e., we do not concern ourselves with what makes an asset “safe”
but, rather, simply accept that investors believe certain assets possess this characteristic),
then the selection between safe assets is explained by the financial depth of an issuing coun-
33A negative coefficient on our variable EXCH reported in column (6) indicates that increases in the
dollar to Special Drawing Rights exchange rate (i.e., dollar depreciation) is associated with a decrease in
US Treasury security holdings. A positive coefficient on NETWt indicates that increases in the US network
(measured as the ratio of US GDP to world GDP) relative to the network of its currency competitors is
associated with an increase in US Treasury security holdings among countries included in Panel B.
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try. The sign on the estimated coefficient of our variable DEPTHt coupled with its lack of
statistical significance challenges the prevailing view.
A natural concern is whether an unexpected, negative sign on DEPTHt is perhaps owing
to the way we have defined the variable. To account for this possibility, we estimate equations
(2.4), (2.7), and (2.9) again using an alternative but commonly used proxy for financial depth:
the ratio of broad money (M3) to GDP. Inspection of the correlation coefficients indicates
that while our original measure of financial depth (the sum of a country’s domestic private
credit [DPRIVjt], stock market capitalization [SCAPjt], and bond market capitalization
[BCAPjt] relative to GDP) is very weakly correlated with our new measure, the latter
is highly correlated with our variable EXCHit (r=-0.903).
34 Thus, we follow the same
procedure outlined in section (2.4) to estimate equations (2.4), (2.7), and (2.9) with and
without EXCHit included as a regressor. Our results are presented in Table 6.
34A formal presentation of our correlation matrix using an alternative definition of financial depth can be
found in Table 17 of Appendix A.
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Importantly, the coefficient on our variable of interest, CREDit, is robust to an alterna-
tive measure of financial depth. Our results also indicate that the estimated coefficient for
DEPTHt continues to be negative when first differences and IV estimation strategies are
adopted and remains so when China is omitted as an observation and EXCHt is removed
as a control variable. The estimated coefficient on DEPTHt is not statistically significant
when EXCHt is included in the model as a control variable but becomes significant at the
1% level when EXCHt is omitted. While we favor the more comprehensive definition of
financial depth that was utilized in the original empirical analysis (the results of which are
reported in Table 3.3), the persistence of a negative sign on the estimated coefficient on
DEPTHt serves to confirm the robustness of our original result.
Additionally, while an alternative operationalization of financial depth has not changed
the direction in which our independent variables influence USTSt, the magnitudes and sta-
tistical significance of some coefficients have indeed changed. Namely, Y IELDt is no longer
statistically significant and increases in magnitude when EXCHt is included as a control
variable, suggesting that perhaps those elements of a more robust definition of financial depth
(utilized in the first set of estimations reported in Table 3.3) serve to artificially reduce the
correlation between Y IELDt and USTSt. Further, the coefficient on our variable represent-
ing network effects, NETWt, is now statistically significant, indicating that perhaps those
elements of a more robust definition of financial depth are correlated with NETWt.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
The prevailing view is that the persistent foreign demand for US Treasury securities
(i.e., persistent lending to the US) is owing to favorable investor perception of US economic
fundamentals, namely financial depth. In this paper, we rely on the sovereign debt literature
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to argue that perception alone cannot motivate sovereign lending. Rather, sovereign lending
requires the existence of an endogenous enforcement mechanism to secure repayment. This
mechanism cannot plausibly be said to exist in the current lending environment given the
disparity in strength between developing and emerging market economy lenders and advanced
economy borrowers.
In this essay, we provide evidence that US Treasury securities act as collateral to dollar
credit. Additionally, while perception is impossible to capture empirically, our results indi-
cate that variation in the relative financial depth of the US does not explain the variation
in holdings of US Treasury securities. Our results imply that the continued financing of the
US deficit and the dollar’s global role are not solely dependent on investor perception and
so cannot be entirely vulnerable to the latter.
This research has generated possibly fruitful areas for future inquiry. Naturally, the
analysis could be improved dramatically with a panel dataset that includes more cross-
sectional units and time periods. This possibility, however, necessarily relies on factors
beyond the researcher’s control, so we offer suggestions that can feasibly be undertaken.
Our research has shed light on the contemporaneous relationship between outstanding
dollar credit and holdings of US Treasury securities among developing and emerging market
economies. Future research may try to determine whether and how our results might change
when lags are introduced into the estimating equation (i.e., how current and past values of
outstanding dollar credit are related to holdings of US Treasury securities, given current and
past values of our control variables. It may also be interesting to test whether the relationship
between outstanding dollar credit and holdings of US Treasury securities in developing and
emerging market economies was more or less pronounced during different time periods.
Future research could also be devoted to investigating the determinants of inertia in a
reserve asset. Our research has demonstrated that at least part of the variation in holdings
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of US Treasury securities that would otherwise be resigned to inertia, is actually owing to
the asset’s role as collateral to dollar borrowing. While we do not claim that inertia plays
no role in the persistence of an asset in foreign exchange reserves, the empirical research
thus far (including our own current endeavor) has shown that it is quite substantial and in
the order of at least 50% (i.e., at least 50% of the level of US Treasury securities in foreign
exchange reserves from time period to the next is explained by way of the latter’s inertia).
While this may indeed reflect reality, the reflection does not seem to have been rigorously
challenged in light of other possibilities.
Guidance in what these other possibilities or determinants of inertia might be is provided
by the key highlights and results of this essay. Sovereign immunity threatens virtually any
contract where a sovereign nation is a counterparty whose compliance is required. Thus,
it may be the case that US Treasury securities act to collateralize other contracts between
sovereign nations and future endeavors may empirically test whether this is the case.
Another avenue for future research is investigation of our unexpected negative coefficient
on the variable representing the financial depth of the US relative to its currency competitors
(DEPTH t). This negative coefficient persisted after the estimating equation was transformed
to account for unobserved heterogeneity, the outlier China was removed, and an alternative
definition of financial depth was adopted. This result also echoes Chinn and Frankel’s (2005)
findings whereby the financial depth of a currency issuer is found to be statistically insignifi-
cant and negatively related to the currency composition of foreign exchange reserves. Future
work could seek to explain the mechanisms that underlie these counterintuitive results.
Finally, our results demonstrate that though China has a disproportionate amount of
outstanding dollar credit and US Treasury securities, the relationship between these two
variables is less pronounced for China than it is for other developing and emerging market
economies in our sample. Future research could therefore be devoted to investigating what
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seems to be a unique set of determinants of the currency composition of China’s foreign
exchange reserves.
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C H A P T E R 3
THE COST OF A SWIFT KICK: ESTIMATING THE COSTS
OF FINANCIAL SANCTIONS ON IRAN
3.1 Introduction
The reality of one country (or city-state) sanctioning another has been in existence at
least since the time of Ancient Greece.1 Since that time, this reality has also generated an
accompanying discussion on sanction effectiveness; that is, whether sanctions achieve their
desired impact, what negative externalities they occasion, what costs are borne by sender
countries, and so on.2 Over time, the accompanying questions have not changed as much as
the sanctions themselves. Prior to 2000, most sanctions took the form of trade sanctions:
those banning imports from or exports to a state (Kirshner, 1997). But, these sanctions came
to be viewed as not only inefficient but also devastatingly heavy-handed. The response to
the bluntness and poor performance of trade sanctions was a targeted (i.e.,“smart”) financial
sanction.
In this paper, we argue that the existence of global financial networks has enabled a unique
potential for financial sanctions to be comprehensive in effect. To illustrate, we measure the
1Pericles levied sanctions against nearby Megara in 432 B.C. (Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott, 1990)
2In this paper, we adopt the convention of referring to the sovereign nation imposing a sanction as the
sender and that receiving the sanction as the target
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cost on Iran’s economy of a unique financial sanction requiring its removal from the Society
for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (the “SWIFT sanction”). In so
doing, we demonstrate how global financial networks enable ostensibly targeted financial
sanctions to resemble the heavy-handed tools of compliance they were meant to replace.
The SWIFT sanction presents a unique opportunity to investigate the impact of global
financial networks wielded as a sanctioning tool. First, Iran is the first and only nation to be
punitively excluded from SWIFT. Second, because the Iranian economy has operated under
a host of sanctions for nearly half a century, the impact of the SWIFT sanction provides
insight into how its unique form compares with its predecessors.
To evaluate the impact of the SWIFT sanction on Iran’s economy, we utilize quarterly
data on Iran’s real gross domestic product (in purchasing power parity [PPP] adjusted,
2015 international dollars) during the period 1988-2016. This data is obtained from the
Central Bank of Iran and the Statistical Center of Iran. We employ a time-series forecasting
technique to measure the cost of the SWIFT sanctions to Iran’s real gross domestic product
(GDP), where cost is measured by the difference between forecasted and actual real GDP.
We further perform a robustness check using a distributed lag model to control for potential
confounders. We find that the average quarterly cost of the SWIFT sanction to Iran’s
real GDP is approximately $204.3 billion (PPP-adjusted, 2015 international dollars) which
represents approximately 14.7% and 13.8% of Iran’s average quarterly actual and forecasted
GDP, respectively.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the development of financial sanc-
tions. Section 3.3 outlines how financial sanctions have evolved with the existence of global fi-
nancial networks. Section 3.4 describes the empirical analysis employed and results obtained,
including a robustness check to control for potential confounders. Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 The Development of Financial Sanctions
A sanction or punishment levied by one sovereign nation onto another can take many
forms: a sovereign nation and/or a coalition of countries might intervene against another
militarily, sever diplomatic ties, close its borders to citizens of a target country, and/or
restrict membership to international organizations. When sanctions specifically affect the
flow of resources—whether trade or financial —to and from a target country, then sanctions
are considered economic sanctions.
A more specific and widely-accepted definition of what constitutes an economic sanction
does not exist. That is, groups of theorists have arrived at separate conclusions and this has
long been a point of frustration for researchers (Nossal, 1989). Broad characterizations of
definition-groupings are possible, however. Generally speaking, definitions of sanctions are
filed into two broad categories depending on whether the objective of sanctions is believed
to be to punish or express. The punishment perspective of sanctions can be further broken
down into two groups: means-ends and retributive. In the means-ends perspective, the goal
of sanctions is to elicit compliance from a target; that is, sanctions are the means to the
end of amending the target’s behavior (Daoudi and Dajani, 1983; Askari, Forrer,Teegan and
Yang, 2002; Davis and Engerman, 2003; Early, 2012).
In the retributive perspective, the goal of sanctions is simply to punish with no necessary
requirement that a target comply with a sender’s demands. In other words, a sanction can be
retribution for violating an international norm and can thusly be successful even if the target
does not amend objectionable behavior. Whereas the goal of sanctions in the punishment
perspective is to mete out a sentence for the violation of some law or norm, the expressive
view of sanctions holds that sanctions can be used as a signaling mechanism to demonstrate
support or disfavor (Galtung, 1967). For instance, Klotz (1995) argues that US sanctions
against apartheid in South Africa operated against US material interests but were imposed
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to signal to the global community that the US supports racial equality.
In addition to different definitions of economic sanctions, there are also two generally
different types: trade and financial. Though both types of sanctions aim to stop the flow of
resources to and from a target country, their difference lies in the nature of the flows they aim
to stop. The goal of trade sanctions is to stop the flow of goods, thereby hindering a target
nation from earning gains from trade. Financial sanctions, however, aim to stop the flow of
funds to and from a target country. Thus, the methods of financial sanctions include but are
not limited to freezing a target’s assets; cutting off sources of credit, aid, and/or payment
facilitation; and imposing monetary pressures onto a target economy (Drezner, 2011). Until
recently, most sanctions have taken the form of trade sanctions.
For roughly the past two decades, however, trade sanctions have increasingly come to be
viewed as blunt and inefficient tools of coercion, primarily owing to their performance in Iraq.
In August 1990, four days after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, the United Nations
Security Council levied comprehensive trade sanctions onto Iraq.3 The sanctions required
that members and non-members of the United Nations refrain from exporting to or importing
from Iraq or Kuwait. Given the likelihood of a military intervention, the sanctions were
easily seen as a more humane alternative to outright war, but some researchers argued the
consequences were just as harmful (Normand, 1996; Lopez and Cortright, 1997). Shortages
of medicine, clean water and food were widespread, risks of child mortality increased four-
fold, and infant mortality jumped 6.1 percentage points (Ali and Shah, 2000; Daponte and
Garfield, 2000; Garfield, 2002). By the time sanctions were lifted, they had levied a cost
onto Iraq’s economy equaling 54% of its gross national product (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott
and Oegg, 2007).
The sanctions levied onto Iraq in 1990 not only elicited a humanitarian crisis but were also
3United National Security Council Resolution 661
78
counterproductive. Lopez and Cortright (1997) argue that in targeting the civilian popula-
tion, the sanctions imposed onto Iraq spared government elites who possessed the means to
circumvent them. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the potential for circumvention of key
groups within a target country is at least partly exacerbated in a non-democracy. Exercising
a relatively larger degree of control over the economy, key groups in non-democracies are bet-
ter capable of diverting sanction costs, extracting rents from the citizenry, and orchestrating
smuggling efforts to circumvent sanctions (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999). Additionally,
the sanctions were also counterproductive because they deprived opposition groups of cru-
cial resources needed to mount a viable campaign against the Iraqi government (Lopez and
Cortright, 1997).
Sanctions did not only disable opposition groups, however. They also enabled the Iraqi
government to play the hero to its citizenry which facilitated political integration in the target
(Lopez and Cortright, 1997). Galtung (1967) calls this phenomenon a rally around the flag
effect : sanctions foster the target’s political integration because its citizenry collectively
blames a common enemy (the sender) for their economic hardship. In non-democracies, this
effect has the perverse result that sanction costs are more easily diverted to the citizenry at
the same time that the existence of sanctions provides a scapegoat for their adverse effects.
In such a context —as characterized Iraq in 1990 —any aid given by a target government to
its citizenry is viewed by the latter sympathetically as a rescue effort.
The general response to the failures of comprehensive trade sanctions was to increasingly
employ financial sanctions, argued to be ”smarter” because they could be applied in a more
targeted fashion: individual financial assets could be frozen, select loans could be refused for
debt rescheduling, financial assistance for particular individuals could be rejected, etc. Thus,
targeted or ”smart” financial sanctions promised to accomplish the seemingly unachievable
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goal of being both more humane and successful.4 Specifically, by targeting financial sanctions
to a specific elite, civilian populations would be spared —thereby sidestepping humanitarian
impacts and removing the potential for target governments to facilitate a rally around the flag
effect —and pivotal target groups would be prevented in their effort to circumvent sanctions.
Owing to their theorized advantages, financial sanctions have become increasingly pop-
ular as a tool of compliance. Indeed, the use of sanctions surged following the events of
September 11, 2001, and targeted financial sanctions were utilized almost exclusively. So
far, their relative effectiveness is supported by the results: the success rate of financial
sanctions relative to trade sanctions is found to be 41% and 25%, respectively (Lopez and
Cortright, 1997).
3.3 The Evolution of Targeted Financial Sanctions
The adoption of targeted financial sanctions also coincided with an important develop-
ment: the enhancement of US capabilities to monitor and influence global financial trans-
actions. Most notably, in 2006 the CIA, overseen by the Treasury department, secretly
subpoenaed and won access to the financial records database of SWIFT.
SWIFT is a private, Brussels-based global financial messaging network. Because it is
simply a messaging network, the company neither maintains deposit accounts nor transfers
actual funds; rather, it simply delivers a standardized financial message (Lichtbau and Risen,
2006). To gain a more concrete sense of how SWIFT operates, consider a simple thought
experiment: imagine three individuals—Q, R, and S —residing in the same town of the
United States. Suppose that Q wants to give $10 to R but that instead of walking to R’s
house and handing it to her, Q opts to employ the services of S. For a fee, S will ask Q
4In this context, ”success” is meant to indicate a change in the target’s policies.
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to complete a form for deposit (we might properly consider it to be a simple check) that S
created in consultation with Q and R’s banks (in this way, S’s financial message is convenient
to and therefore preferred by Q and R’s banks.) Once Q completes the form, S delivers it to
R’s banking institution and upon its receipt, a process is initiated whereby $10 is removed
from Q’s banking account and deposited into R’s. In this simple example, S essentially
performs the same function as SWIFT: S simply delivers a financial message (i.e., a form or
check).
Given the ease with which two individuals residing in the same town can transact, Q’s
use of a messenger service is perhaps only justified by her own laziness. But in the global
financial arena, the movement of funds is naturally quite complex, and so it is in this context
that SWIFT provides a crucial service, all the more because it is unique. That is, SWIFT
is the only common infrastructure through which global financial institutions can transact.5
To continue our previous hypothetical, we might imagine a circumstance whereby the only
way Q and R’s banks can interact is through S’s form for deposit. In this case, S becomes
not only a messenger but also a network since she possesses a unique platform through which
people and funds are connected. In the same way, SWIFT is also a network (i.e., it is also a
platform through which financial institutions communicate.)
The ability to monitor SWIFT transactions represented a significant breakthrough in
the US capacity to monitor global financial transactions not only because of the function
SWIFT serves but also because of its ubiquity. When it was founded in the 1970s, SWIFT
could claim as members 518 different institutions from 22 different countries and it processed
roughly ten million messages annually. Today, it claims as members 11,000 institutions from
over 200 countries and processes approximately 26 million messages in one day (SWIFT
5It should be noted that in response to the advent of a SWIFT sanction, some alternatives to the SWIFT
platform were initiated (e.g., Russia’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages or China’s Cross-Border
Interbank Payment System), though none can reasonably be said to compete with SWIFT.
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Annual Review, 2016). It is believed that the dollar-value of SWIFT transactions in 2001
was more than $7.7 trillion annually, or more than one-third of total world exports of goods
and services in 2016 (Scott and Zachariadis, 2014).
In 2012, the US used its access to the SWIFT network strategically as a sanctioning
tool.6 In March of that year, the Islamic Republic of Iran became the first sovereign nation
to be removed from the SWIFT platform. Though new in form, the sanction was touted as
being identical to its predecessors in effect and benefit. For instance, David Cohen —Under
Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence from 2011 to 2015 —made
a number of assurances that the SWIFT sanctions were targeted, allowed for the import of
food and medicine, and minimized damage to the Iranian people (Faucon, 2012). Cohen’s
2014 statements published by the Treasury are illustrative:
We have been able to move away from clunky and heavy-handed instruments of economic
power...Sanctions that focus on bad actors within the financial sector are far more
precise and far more effective than traditional trade sanctions. And the trade
restrictions that we continue to employ today are also smarter and more surgical,
targeting specific classes of products rather than cutting off entire economies.
(Remarks of Under Secretary, 2014)
Given the vast literature on sanctions, this sanction episode has received a great deal of
attention.7 Seemingly unnoticed, however, is what a radical departure from the standard
sanction a SWIFT cutoff has the potential to be. Throughout much of the nineties, the terms
targeted financial sanctions, smart sanctions and financial sanctions were used interchange-
ably. And this makes sense. Some thirty years ago, there did not exist any other option but
to make financial sanctions targeted. Sovereign-to-sovereign transactions occurred, for the
6It is worth mentioning that being a private company, SWIFT was and continues to be reluctant to be
used as a sanctioning tool. The ability to leverage SWIFT strategically was therefore the product of an
active lobbying effort, namely by United Against Nuclear Iran.
7A sanction episode is the period of time between sanctions implementation and removal.
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most part, in a dyadic setting so that there were natural limits to the kind of financial cutoff
a single country could impose onto another. That is, the US acting unilaterally could only
freeze financial assets in US banks or stop payments from a target to specific US businesses.
Today’s global environment is quite different, however. The existence of SWIFT demon-
strates that countries are increasingly capable of interacting within a financial network and
the platform’s ubiquity demonstrates the importance of maintaining unimpeded access to it
(Davis and Engerman, 2003; Joshi and Mahmud, 2016, 2018). Together, what these devel-
opments imply for financial sanctions is that the latter now have the potential to become
comprehensive in nature. That is, by depriving a sovereign nation of access to the only
platform available to receive and send payments in a globalized economy, it is likely that the
effect will reflect a comprehensive approach; indeed, we argue that the impact of the SWIFT
sanction to its first recipient, Iran, serves to substantiate the point.
3.3.1 Targeted Financial Sanctions in Iran
The Islamic Republic of Iran has been the target of a consistent barrage of sanctions since
the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Prior to 2007, most sanctions levied against Iran were trade-
based and aimed against Iran’s energy sector. In 2007, however, the Bush Administration
imposed its first targeted financial sanction (i.e., ”smart” sanction) against Iran’s fourth
largest bank, Bank Sepah, for its alleged support of entities affiliated with Iran’s nuclear
program. Under Executive Order 13382, the Bank’s assets under US control were frozen and
US entities were banned from engaging in business with Bank Sepah. Thus, consistent with
the general form of a targeted financial sanction, the punitive measure was contained to the
Bank and its chairman.
Measured against the Bank Sepah sanctions, the SWIFT sanction is notably different in
scope and correspondingly dealt an unprecedented blow to Iran’s general economy. Figure
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Figure 6: Real GDP for Iran 1988-2016
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Notes: The figure plots Iran’s quarterly GDP in billions of PPP-adjusted 2015 international dollars. The
shaded vertical bar represents the duration of the SWIFT sanction. Data is from the Central Bank of Iran
and the Statistical Center of Iran.
6 plots quarterly data on Iran’s real GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted, 2015
international dollars during the period 1988Q4-2016Q4. The shaded vertical bar indicates
the SWIFT sanction episode.
The figure demonstrates that when the SWIFT sanction was first imposed in 2012Q1,
there is a sharp decline in Iran’s real GDP and when it was removed in 2016Q1, there is a
sharp uptick in the same. The figure also shows that between the SWIFT sanction’s initial
implementation (2012Q1) and the period when Iran’s real GDP reached its lowest level in
the sanction period (2013Q4), real GDP declined by $86.35 billion.
Comparing Iran’s real GDP during this time to the real GDP of other oil-exporting and
advanced economies suggests that the sharp movements in Iran’s GDP during the SWIFT
sanction episode is not owing to macroeconomic conditions affecting oil-exporters or the
global economy generally. Figure 7 plots GDP in billions of purchasing power parity (PPP)
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adjusted, 2011 international dollars for all Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC) and Group of Seven (G7) member-countries. The shaded vertical bar represents
the duration of the SWIFT sanction episode.
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Figure 7 demonstrates that the countries sampled did not experience a sharp increase
and decrease at the beginning and end of the SWIFT sanction, respectively. Libya seems
to be the only OPEC member-country to experience a sharp downturn in real GDP near
the start of the SWIFT sanction episode, but this is more likely owing to the 2011 US-led
military intervention into Libya.
In this paper, we interpret the sharp decline in Iran’s real GDP in 2012Q1 as being a direct
result of the SWIFT sanction imposed onto the economy during that time. Accordingly, we
argue that the magnitude of the SWIFT sanction’s impact to Iran’s real GDP provides
evidence to our claim that the use of global financial networks as a sanctioning tool has
caused ”targeted” financial sanctions to behave more like comprehensive trade sanctions in
effect. We focus on the impact to Iran’s real GDP because a targeted financial sanction
is one that is contained to a financial and governmental elite within the target country.
By definition, then, any spillover effects impacting the level of goods and services in the
target’s real economy naturally constitute a failure of any targeted objective. Accordingly,
Pape (1997) comments, ”Economic sanctions characteristically aim to impose costs on the
economy as a whole...Accordingly, the most important measure of the intensity of economic
sanctions aggregate gross national product (GNP) loss over time” (p.4).
Though the sharp movements in Iran’s GDP correspond exactly to the application and
removal of the SWIFT sanction, care should be taken when making a causal claim. To this
end, in the next section we evaluate the impact of the SWIFT sanction on Iran’s real GDP
by controlling for potential confounders. Then, we calculate the annual cost to Iran’s real
GDP of the SWIFT sanction using a time-series forecasting method and discuss our results.
To the best of our knowledge, this undertaking constitutes the first empirical analysis of the
impact to Iran’s real GDP of the SWIFT sanction.
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3.4 Empirical Analysis
3.4.1 Causality Test
To further support the notion that the sharp movements in Iran’s GDP can be interpreted
as measuring a causal effect of the SWIFT sanction, we provide a time-series analysis to
control for potential confounders. Specifically, we control for the following: the international
price of crude oil (OIL) to control for the possibility that a change in Iran’s real GDP during
the SWIFT sanction is due to fluctuations in the global price of crude oil; Iran’s government
expenditure (EXP) to control for the possiblity that a change in Iran’s real GDP during
the SWIFT sanction is due to changes in the level of domestic government expenditure; and
global economic conditions (G20 ) to control for the possibility that any change in Iran’s
real GDP during the SWIFT sanction is simply owing to more general global economic
conditions.
The frequency of the data for all of our variables is quarterly and spans the time period
1988Q4-2016Q4, giving us 116 observations for each variable. Owing to data availability
issues, data on Iran’s real GDP and government expenditure is obtained from two sources.
For data prior to and including 1990Q4, GDP data on Iran’s real GDP is obtained from the
Central Bank of Iran; after 1990Q4, real GDP data is obtained from the Statistical Center
of Iran. For Iran’s government expenditure, data prior to and including 1991Q4 is obtained
from the Central Bank of Iran and data after 1991Q4 is obtained from the Statistical Center
of Iran. In both cases, the data has been rebased in billions of purchasing power parity
adjusted, 2015 international dollars. That is, $1 of government expenditure or real GDP
has the same purchasing power as $1 in the US in 2015. The Average Petroleum Spot Price
(APSP) Crude Oil Index is used to represent the international price of crude oil and data is
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retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.8 Finally, data on the GDP for G20
countries is obtained from OECDStat. Table 1 provides summary statistics on the variables
that serve as our potential confounders.
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
GDP Iran (GDPt) 943.19 347.00 402.75 1499.20
APSP Index (OILt) 84.90 61.16 21.81 227.26
GDP G20 (G20t) 2788.47 488.69 1965.91 3597.19
Government Expenditure (EXPt) 133.24 36.87 66.77 205.57
Notes: GDP Iran is obtained from the Central Bank of Iran and the Statistical Center of Iran. APSP
Index is from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Database (FRED). G20 is from the
OECD Statistics database (OECDStat). Government Expenditure for Iran is from the Central Bank
of Iran and Statistical Center of Iran
Our goal is to determine whether any of these potential confounders has a substantial
effect on Iran’s GDP during the SWIFT sanction. Figure 8 compares plots of our confounder
variables during the period 1988Q4-2016Q4, where the shaded vertical line corresponds to
the SWIFT sanction (the event of interest). At first glance, it does not seem that the
movements in our potential confounder variables would have impacted Iran’s real GDP
during the SWIFT sanction in a substantive way.
The behavior of our potential confounders during the SWIFT sanction episode seems
to conform to their respective trends, making it unlikely that they would have contributed
to the movements of Iran’s real GDP during this periods in a significant way. The only
exception is perhaps the price of crude oil which, as panel (d) in Figure 8 depicts, dropped
precipitously beginning in the second quarter of 2014.
In theory, it is possible that this sharp decline in crude oil prices impacted the Iranian
economy in one of two ways, depending on whether demand for Iranian oil was the cause of
8The APSP Crude Oil Index is a simple average of three spot prices for oil: Dated Brent, West Texas
Intermediate, and Dubai Fateh.
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Figure 8: Confounders
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Notes: Panel (a) plots Iran’s quarterly real GDP in billions of purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted 2015
international dollars. Data for panel (a) is obtained from the Central Bank of Iran and the Statistical Center
of Iran. Panel (b) plots government expenditure for Iran in billions of PPP-adjusted 2015 international
dollars. Data for panel (b) is from the Statistical Center of Iran. Panel (c) plots real GDP for the Group of
Twenty (G20) countries in billions of PPP-adjusted 2010 US dollars. Data is obtained from the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development Statistics database (OECD.Stat). Panel (d) plots values for
the APSP Crude Oil Index where 2005=100. Data for Panel (d) is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis Economic Data (FRED) database. The shaded vertical bar in Panels (a)-(d) represents the
duration of the SWIFT sanction.
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decline in global crude oil prices. If the precipitous decline in global crude oil prices occurred
irrespective of demand for Iranian crude oil, then we might reasonably expect the decline to
correspond with a decrease in Iran’s real GDP since a lower global price of crude oil would
lessen the appeal of a cheaper alternative.9
Panel (a) in Figure 8 depicts a slight increase in Iran’s real GDP beginning in roughly
the third quarter of 2015. Given the delayed and seemingly negligible change in Iran’s real
GDP, it is unclear whether the sharp movements in the global price of crude oil had any
meaningful impact.
To more accurately assess the impact of our potential confounders on Iran’s real GDP, we
estimate a distributed lag model which allows us to understand how current and past values
of our potential confounders affect Iran’s real GDP. Specifically, we use quarterly data during
the period 1988Q4-2016Q4 and estimate the following regression after first-differencing our
variables to obtain stationarity:
4GDPt = α +
p∑
j=0
δj4OILt−j +
p∑
j=0
θj4EXPt−j +
p∑
j=0
γj4G20t−j + βDt +4t (3.1)
where p is the lag length chosen on the basis of the BIC criterion; GDPt is Iran’s quarterly
real GDP at time t in billions of PPP-adjusted, 2015 international dollars; OILt is the
global price of oil at time t based on the APSP Crude Oil Index in US dollars per barrel;
EXPt is the level of Iran’s government expenditure at time t in billions of PPP-adjusted,
2015 international dollars; G20t is the average GDP for a subset of Group of Twenty (G20)
member countries in billions of PPP-adjusted, 2010 international dollars; and Dt is a dummy
9This point is related to a strand of the sanctions literature arguing that the existence of a third-party
nation who will trade with a target (i.e., a sanctions buster), has substantial impact on whether a sanction
will be successful. Crucially, the willingness of a third-party nation to help a target circumvent sanctions
is higher the more profitable the arrangement. Applied to the present case, this argument logically implies
that the higher the global price of crude oil, the higher the likelihood that nations will be willing to incur
the risk of acting as a sanctions buster to purchase a cheaper alternative. (Hanlon, 1986; Early, 2013)
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variable at time t for the SWIFT sanction set to one for each quarter during the SWIFT
sanction episode and set to zero otherwise.10 Table 8 shows our results from estimating
equation (3.1).
Table 8: Robustness Time-Series Regression
Dependent variable: ∆GDPt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SANCTION (Dt) −14.527∗∗∗ −15.339∗∗∗ −14.327∗∗∗ −13.454∗∗∗
(3.601) (3.349) (3.352) (3.547)
∆APSP t −0.019 −0.012 0.055
(0.067) 0.067 (0.052)
∆G20 t 0.199
∗∗ 0.193∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗
(0.080) 0.081 (0.067)
∆EXP t −0.452 −0.450 −0.434
(0.383) (0.383) (0.393)
Observations 678 678 678 678
R2 0.558 0.155 0.175 0.147
Adjusted R2 0.521 0.132 0.152 0.123
Notes: The dependent variable in all four specifications is Iran’s real GDP in billions of PPP-
adjusted, 2015 international dollars. Columns (1)-(4) reports results from estimating the distributed
lag model specified in equation 3.1 when all potential confounders are included (Column [1]), ∆ EXP
is omitted (Column [2]), ∆ APSPt is omitted (Column [3]), and ∆ G20t is omitted (Column[4]),
respectively. All regressions include robust standard errors. ∗∗∗p<0.001; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗p<0.05
Given our potential confounders, the coefficient estimate for our sanction dummy variable
(Dt) is statistically significant at the .1% level and large, indicating that the quarterly change
in Iran’s real GDP (in PPP-adjusted, 2015 international dollars) was approximately $14.5
billion lower when the SWIFT sanction was in effect than when it was not. The sanction
dummy variable (Dt) remains nearly unchanged across the four specifications of our model
(reported in Columns [1]-[4], respectively), suggesting that failure to control for our potential
10G20 member countries included in the calculation of this variable were selected based on data availability
and include Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, South Africa, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
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confounders in forecasting Iran’s real GDP will have no meaningful effect on our results.11
We thus proceed to forecasting Iran’s GDP in the next section.
3.4.2 Univariate Time-series Forecasting Method
In this section, a univariate time-series forecasting model is used to determine what Iran’s
GDP would have been if the SWIFT sanction had not been imposed in 2012. Students of
econometrics will recall that a key assumption needed to develop estimators for a classical
regression model is that there is no covariance between disturbances of different observations
(i.e., the disturbances are non-autoregressive). Though violation of this assumption poses
a distinct problem for regression analysis, the correlation between data can be harnessed in
time-series analysis to make predictions. Applied to forecasting, time-series models use past
data values to predict future values and so are unlike structural macroeconomic models that
attempt to define a trend through causal relationships between variables that is informed
by economic theory. Though unable to explain causation, time-series forecasting techniques
are particularly useful tools when the movement of values is thought to be influenced by a
complex set of relationships. With regard to these complex dynamics (as naturally underlies
movements in macroeconomic indicators), structural macroeconomic models are vulnerable
to misspecification, endogeneity, and omitted variable bias, thus making time-series fore-
casting techniques an especially effective alternative (Marcellino, 2008; Keck, Raubold and
Truppia, 2010; Wang, 2016).
The dynamics that underlie movements in Iran’s GDP are complex, indeed. The econ-
11It should be noted, however, that the average GDP of G20 member countries (∆G20 ) has a positive
and statistically significant effect (p < 0.01) on Iran’s real GDP given changes in the market price of oil and
Iran’s government expenditure, as well as the SWIFT sanction episode. Yet, a convincing case emerges for
pursuing a simple forecast of Iran’s real GDP using its own structural processes when we consider that to the
extent that failure to control for4G20 biases our forecast estimates, our results indicate that the direction of
bias is downward. Note, for instance, that when ∆G20 is omitted from equation 3.1, the coefficient estimate
for our sanction dummy variable (reported in Column [4]) is approximately $1.1 billion lower in absolute
value terms than when ∆G20 is included in equation 3.1.
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omy has operated under a host of sanctions since 1979 that are different in scope, effect,
and duration. A significant literature exists theorizing the effect of sanctions on economies,
governments, and citizenries, but there does not exist a wide-ranging consensus view on the
effect of individual sanctions, much less on the dynamics of multiple and variable sanctions
(Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg, 2007; Eriksson, 2016; Haidar, 2017). In short, the
sanctions regime imposed on Iran since the Revolution makes it difficult to understand the
dynamics of Iranian GDP in a way that would readily lend itself to forecasting using a struc-
tural macroeconomic model. Use of a structural macroeconomic model is also complicated
by a common problem that is only exacerbated in the case of a pariah state: data availability
(Valadkhani, 2003; Alaedini and Ashrafzadeh, 2016).
In this analysis, we circumvent these difficulties by using Iran’s own structural processes
to predict what real GDP would have been if the SWIFT sanctions had not been imposed.
Accordingly, we follow the Box and Jenkins methodology (1976) to fit a seasonal, autoregres-
sive integrated moving average (seasonal ARIMA) model to forecast Iran’s GDP during the
time-period 2012Q1-2016Q4 (the entire duration of the SWIFT sanction implementation).
We are prompted to use a seasonal ARIMA because the periodic fluctuations in Iran’s GDP
prior to the SWIFT episode illustrated in Figure 6 suggest that the series possibly possesses
a seasonal component which, if present, must be accounted for in our time-series model.
That the time series variable representing Iran’s GDP possesses a seasonal component
is more clearly seen in Figure 9 which presents a seasonal plot of Iran’s GDP prior to the
SWIFT sanction episode in panel (a) and a seasonal subseries plot of the residuals of a linear
model relating Iran’s GDP and the time period in panel (b).
By plotting each observation against each quarter (or season), panel (a) in Figure 9
suggests that the series indeed possesses a seasonal component: Iran’s GDP typically peaks
in Q1, declines slowly into the second quarter, and then slowly increases.
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Figure 9: Seasonal Component of Iran’s GDP
Notes: Panel (a) plots Iran’s quarterly real GDP in billions of PPP-adjusted 2015 international dollars
against each quarter. Panel (b) plots the residuals of a linear model relating Iran’s GDP (in billions of
PPP-adjusted, 2015 international dollars) and the time period.
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Panel (b) of Figure 9 also confirms the existence of a seasonal component. The seasonal
subseries plot featured plots the residuals of a linear model relating Iran’s GDP and the
quarterly time period (to detrend the data prior to plotting), where the horizontal blue line
delineates the mean for each quarterly subseries. The plot demonstrates that, on average,
the series reaches a maximum in the first quarter, a minimum in the second quarter, and
then slowly increases. Thus, an ARIMA model that accounts for a seasonal component in
our time series variable to be forecasted is necessitated.
A seasonal ARIMA model forecasts a time-series based on the assumption that it is a
multiplicative combination of its non-seasonal and seasonal components. Its general form in
backshift notation (for conciseness) is expressed as,
ΦP (B
s)φp(B)∇Ds ∇dZt = θq(B)ΘQ(Bs)at (3.2)
where p, d, and q represent the order of the autoregressive (AR), integrated (I), and moving
average (MA) processes, respectively, for the non-seasonal component representing the time
series; P , D, and Q represent the order of the AR, I, and MA processes, respectively, for
the seasonal component representing the time series; s is the period of seasonality; B is the
backshift operator; ΦP (B
s) and φp(B) are the seasonal AR operator of order P and the
non-seasonal AR operator of order p, respectively; ΘQ(B
s) and θq(B) are the seasonal MA
operator of order Q and the non-seasonal MA operator of order q, respectively; ∇Ds is the
seasonal backward difference operator for D differences and s periods and ∇d is the non-
seasonal backward difference operator for d differences and s periods; Zt is the time-series
to be forecasted; and at is a white noise process. In simplified form, the seasonal ARIMA
model is written as ARIMA(p, d, q)(P,D,Q)s.
Fitting an ARIMA (p, d, q)(P,D,Q)s model requires that the underlying time series be
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stationary. Figure 6 demonstrates that Iran’s GDP exhibits a strong upward trend; thus, the
data is first-differenced (d=1) and an Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test — a standard
formal test for stationarity — is used to confirm stationarity. The results from performing
an ADF test on our variable for Iran’s real GDP are presented in Table 1.3 and confirm our
series is integrated of order 1.
Table 9: ADF Test
ADF
Test Statistic
GDPt −0.920
∆GDPt −4.656∗∗∗
Notes: The variable GDPt represents Iran’s GDP
(PPP-adjusted, 2015 International dollars) in time pe-
riod t. Lag orders are chosen to minimize the Bayesian
information criterion. Statistical significance of the
test statistic indicates rejection of the null hypothesis
that the series follows a unit root process. ∗∗∗p<0.001;
∗∗p<0.01; ∗p<0.05
To account for the seasonal component of our quarterly time series for Iran’s GDP, we
apply a seasonal difference where s, the period of seasonality, equals 4.12
The auto.arima() function in R is utilized to select an ARIMA(p, d, q)(P,D,Q)s model
based on minimizing the Bayesian information criterion (BIC).13 The result is an ARIMA
(1, 1, 1)(0, 0, 1)4 model with drift. Thus, our model takes the following form where GDPt
12The resulting autocorrelation function (ACF) and partial autocorrelation function (PACF) of the trans-
formed series (i.e., the seasonal difference of the first difference of Iran’s GDP) is shown in Figure 13 of
Appendix B. The ACF plots the correlation between the variable being forecasted (here, Iran’s real GDP)
and its past values. The PACF plots the correlation between the variable being forecasted and its past values
that is not the result of previous correlations.
13The BIC offer one solution to the challenge of choosing parameter values for an ARIMA (p, d, q)(P,D,Q)s
model. The problem arises from the fact that if too high a value is chosen, forecasts may suffer from increased
estimation error whereas if too low a value is chosen, forecasts may ignore relevant information contained in
past values. The BIC penalizes increases to the parameter values so that the true parameter values can be
determined.
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represents Iran’s GDP (in billions of PPP-adjusted, 2015 international dollars) at time t and
µ is a constant.
φ1(B)(1−B)GDPt = µ+ θ1(B)Θ1(B4)at (3.3)
Table 10 displays our results from estimating equation (3.3) and the calculated Ljung-Box
statistic through 8 lags is 4.40 and statistically insignificant, indicating that the residuals of
our estimated model follow a white-noise process.
Table 10: Forecast Summary
ARIMA(1,1,1)(0,0,1)4 Estimate
with drift
Constant 11.47
(2.19)
AR(1) 0.96
(0.04)
MA(1) -0.65
(0.09)
SMA(1) -0.79
(0.09)
N 113
Log-likelihood -356.88
AIC 723.75
BIC 736.36
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis
Using our ARIMA (1, 1, 1)(0, 0, 1)4 model with drift, we forecast values for Iran’s real
GDP over the entire SWIFT sanction episode (2012Q1-2016Q1). Figure 10 illustrates our
results.
The dashed black line above the noticeable plunge in Iran’s real GDP starting in 2012Q1
is the forecasted value of Iran’s real GDP in billions of purchasing power adjusted, 2015
international dollars. That is, the dashed line represents what Iranian GDP would have
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Figure 10: Forecast of Iran’s real GDP
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been if the SWIFT sanctions had not been imposed and real GDP had continued to follow
the pre-2012Q1 trend. Table 11 compares quarterly forecasted values to actual values for
Iran’s real GDP.
Table 11: Forecast and Cost Estimates
Date Actual GDP Forecasted GDP Lo95 CI Hi95 CI Forecast-Actual
2012Q1 1434.57 1458.13 1435.36 1480.91 23.56
2012Q2 1415.68 1481.63 1443.80 1519.46 65.95
2012Q3 1395.85 1493.17 1439.82 1546.53 97.32
2012Q4 1372.37 1505.57 1435.75 1575.39 133.20
2013Q1 1362.09 1519.38 1441.62 1597.14 157.29
2013Q2 1359.12 1533.16 1447.61 1618.71 174.04
2013Q3 1354.66 1546.92 1453.67 1640.16 192.26
2013Q4 1348.22 1560.64 1459.75 1661.54 212.42
2014Q1 1357.38 1574.34 1465.82 1682.87 216.96
2014Q2 1367.37 1588.02 1471.87 1704.16 220.65
2014Q3 1373.09 1601.66 1477.88 1725.44 228.57
2014Q4 1373.54 1615.28 1483.83 1746.73 241.74
2015Q1 1373.64 1628.87 1489.72 1768.01 255.23
2015Q2 1376.33 1642.43 1495.54 1789.32 266.10
2015Q3 1376.55 1655.96 1501.29 1810.64 279.41
2015Q4 1383.70 1669.47 1506.95 1831.99 285.77
2016Q1 1397.17 1682.95 1512.53 1853.37 285.78
2016Q2 1426.65 1696.41 1518.03 1874.78 269.76
2016Q3 1456.74 1709.83 1523.44 1896.23 253.09
2016Q4 1499.20 1723.23 1528.76 1917.71 224.03
Notes: Figures are in billons of purchasing power adjusted 2015 international dollars. Forecasted
GDP is an average of the low and high 95% prediction interval values.
3.4.3 Discussion
The impact to Iran’s real GDP of the SWIFT sanction is sizeable. We calculate that the
average quarterly cost of the SWIFT sanction to Iran’s real GDP is approximately $204.3
billion (PPP-adjusted, 2015 international dollars), or 14.7% and 13.8% of Iran’s average
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quarterly actual and forecasted GDP, respectively. This impact is striking given the steady
upward trend of Iran’s real GDP since roughly 1996, suggesting a resilience to the variety of
sanctions levied against it before SWIFT sanctions were imposed.
One reason why a seemingly targeted financial sanction levied such a substantial cost
onto the Iranian economy is owing to the unique form financial sanctions take when access
to global networks becomes a tool for compliance. By using access to a unique global fi-
nancial network as a sanction, targets are selectively removed from an edifice upon which
international economic relations take place. In practice, therefore, ostensibly targeted finan-
cial sanctions wielding access to global financial networks will resemble the comprehensive
trade sanctions they were intended to replace, with all the latter’s attending humanitarian
impacts.
Indeed, and perhaps unsurprisingly given the shock to Iran’s economy, journalistic ac-
counts began to emerge in and around 2012 reporting shortages of crucial medicines, food-
stuffs, and medical devices in Iran (Bozorgmehr, 2012; Mohammed, 2012; Gladstone, 2013).
Also reported were higher poverty levels owing to rising food prices, high inflation, and in-
creasing unemployment (Warrick and Ball, 2012; Bozorgmehr, 2013; Nasseri and Motevalli,
2015). Formal empirical analyses also confirm journalistic reports; for instance, Setayesh
and Mackey (2016) find that of the 73 drugs in shortage in Iran during the period when the
SWIFT sanction was levied, 44% are classified as essential medicines according to the World
Health Organization.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have argued that the development of global financial networks has
enabled financial sanctions—sanctions aimed at stopping the flow of funds to and from a
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target country—to have a more comprehensive effect. As a result, financial sanctions are
coming to resemble the heavy-handed and inefficient trade sanctions they were meant to
replace. To provide evidence in support of our argument, we focus on a unique set of
financial sanctions levied against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
In 2012, Iran was the first country to have been removed from the Society for World-
wide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT), a global financial messaging service.
Though advertised at the time to be targeted to Iran’s governmental and financial elite, the
financial sanction delivered a sizeable negative shock to Iran’s real economy. To analyze
the impact of this shock, we employ a time-series forecasting model to measure the cost of
exclusion from the SWIFT network on Iran’s real GDP.
By calculating the difference between Iran’s forecasted and actual real GDP, we find that
the cost of the SWIFT sanctions to Iran’s real GDP was, on average, approximately $204.3
billion (PPP-adjusted 2015 international dollars), which represents approximately 14.7% and
13.8% of Iran’s average quarterly actual and forecasted GDP, respectively. We conclude that
the SWIFT sanctions made a considerable impact to Iran’s real GDP which belies the claim
that these sanctions are targeted or “smart.”
How the development of global financial networks has changed the nature of financial
sanctions has been, to the best of our knowledge, unnoticed in the sanctions literature. This is
at least partly because the latter largely still conceptualizes the global arena through a dyadic
framework (that is, sanctions are analyzed on a sovereign-to-sovereign basis rather than on
a network-sovereign basis.)14 Given the potential for financial sanctions to demonstrate the
heavy-handedness and inefficiency characteristic of comprehensive trade sanctions, however,
we conclude that more research is warranted.
14Exceptions include Joshi and Mahmud (2016, 2018).
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Table 13: Country Codes
Country Code
Argentina AR
Brazil BR
Chile CL
China CH
India IN
Indonesia ID
Malaysia MY
Mexico MX
Republic of Korea KR
Russia RU
South Africa ZA
Taiwan TWN
Turkey TR
Table 14: Correlation Matrix
USTSit CREDit EXCHt DEPTHt NETWt YIELDt USTSi,t−1
USTSit 1
CREDit 0.783 1
EXCHt 0.199 0.399 1
DEPTHt −0.036 −0.079 −0.176 1
NETWt 0.004 0.099 0.025 −0.034 1
YIELDt −0.010 0.076 −0.040 −0.196 0.722 1
USTSi,t−1 0.999 0.794 0.205 −0.036 0.009 −0.006 1
Notes: See Table 12 in Appendix A for data sources and definitions.
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Table 15: Variance Inflation Factors
Model: Equation 2.9
Dependent Tolerance VIF
Variable (1) (2)
∆USTS i,t−1 0.939 1.065
∆CRED it 0.945 1.058
∆EXCH it 0.926 1.080
∆DEPTH it 0.832 1.202
∆NETW it 0.831 1.203
∆YIELD it 0.898 1.114
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the level of tol-
erance and VIF for each regression of the depen-
dent variable on a linear combination on the re-
maining independent variables in equation 2.9, re-
spectively. ∆USTS i,t−2 is used as an instrument
for ∆USTS i,t−1.
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Table 16: First Stage for ∆USTSi,t−1
Dependent variable: ∆USTSi,t−1
Panel A Panel B
China included China Omitted
(1) (2)
∆USTSi,t−2 0.710∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.077)
∆CREDit 0.089
∗∗∗ 0.071
(0.025) (0.075)
∆EXCHit 234.998 141.789
(433.145) (248.297)
∆DEPTHit 0.017 0.044
(0.062) (0.049)
∆NETWit 1.181 0.208
(0.979) (0.902)
∆YIELDit 3.061 1.019
(6.550) (2.885)
Observations 689
R2 0.558
Adjusted R2 0.521
Notes: Column 1 is the first-stage regression for Panel A
where China is included in the sample. Column 2 is the
first-stage regression for Panel B where China is omitted
from the sample. Both regressions include time dummies and
robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
For detailed data definitions and sources, see Table 12 in
Appendix A. ∗∗∗p<0.001; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗p<0.05
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Table 17: Correlation Matrix- Alternative Measure of Financial Depth
USTS it CRED it EXCH t DEPTH1 t DEPTH2 t NETW t YIELD t USTS i,t−1
USTS it 1
CRED it 0.782 1
EXCH t 0.174 0.272 1
DEPTH1 t −0.039 −0.084 −0.098 1
DEPTH2 t −0.162 −0.227 −0.915 0.002 1
NETW t 0.003 0.096 0.188 −0.032 0.242 1
YIELD t −0.010 0.076 −0.287 −0.197 0.345 0.722 1
USTS i,t−1 0.999 0.793 0.175 −0.040 −0.160 0.007 −0.005 1
Notes: DEPTH1 t represents financial depth defined as the sum of a country’s domestic private credit, stock market capitalization,
and bond market capitalization relative to GDP. DEPTH2 t represents financial depth defined as the ratio of broad money (M3)
to GDP. See Table 12 in this Appendix A for data sources and definitions.
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Figure 11: ACF and PACF Patterns of Transformed GDP for Iran
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Notes: Panels (a) and (b) illustrate the autocorrelation function (ACF) and partial autocorrelation function
(PACF), respectively, of the seasonal difference of the first difference of Iran’s GDP (in billions of PPP-
adjusted, 2015 international dollars).
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